 |
Globalizing Political Liberalization: Institutionalized International Trade Integration and Political Reforms in Developing Countries
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Globalizing Political Liberalization:
Institutionalized International Trade Integration and
Political Reforms in Developing Countries
∗
Moonhawk Kim
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
## email not listed ##
August 10, 2005
Preliminary Version
Comments Welcome
Abstract
I build on the argument I developed elsewhere that changes in countries’ external
market access rather than simple increases in countries’ trade integration facilitatetheir political liberalization. In this context where changes in the external market ac-cess facilitate political liberalization, countries’ membership in the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) can havetwo competing effects. Membership in the GATT/WTO can amplify the politicallyliberalizing effects of changes in the external market access by constraining politicalleaders’ economic policy freedom. Or, membership in the GATT/WTO can reducethe politically liberalizing effects of changes in the external market access by univer-sally streamlining member countries’ market access and thus minimizing the maximumchanges in their external market access countries can confront. Supporting the secondlogic, statistical analyses of 108 developing countries show that when countries’ ex-ternal market access changed, countries that did not belong to the WTO underwentgreater political liberalization than WTO member countries.
Keywords: Political liberalization, trade, developing countries, GATT/WTO
∗
20050810: Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, September 1-4, 2005. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
|
| |
| |
|
|
Globalizing Political Liberalization:
Institutionalized International Trade Integration and
Political Reforms in Developing Countries
∗
Moonhawk Kim
Department of Political Science
Stanford University
## email not listed ##
August 10, 2005
Preliminary Version
Comments Welcome
Abstract
I build on the argument I developed elsewhere that changes in countries’ external
market access rather than simple increases in countries’ trade integration facilitate
their political liberalization. In this context where changes in the external market ac-
cess facilitate political liberalization, countries’ membership in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) can have
two competing effects. Membership in the GATT/WTO can amplify the politically
liberalizing effects of changes in the external market access by constraining political
leaders’ economic policy freedom. Or, membership in the GATT/WTO can reduce
the politically liberalizing effects of changes in the external market access by univer-
sally streamlining member countries’ market access and thus minimizing the maximum
changes in their external market access countries can confront. Supporting the second
logic, statistical analyses of 108 developing countries show that when countries’ ex-
ternal market access changed, countries that did not belong to the WTO underwent
greater political liberalization than WTO member countries.
Keywords: Political liberalization, trade, developing countries, GATT/WTO
∗
20050810: Prepared for delivery at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, September 1-4, 2005. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Page 1 of 45 
