 |
Pluralism, Agency Autonomy, or Bureaucratic Capture? Public Participation in State Agency Rulemaking
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Pluralism, Agency Autonomy, or Bureaucratic Capture: Public
Participation in State Agency Rulemaking
Neal D. Woods
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
neal.## email not listed ##
Abstract
A substantial body of legislation has emerged at all levels of government which installs procedural mechanisms designed to promote public involvement in administrative rulemaking. Depending upon the literature one consults, one could come to the conclusion that these procedures should enhance regulatory stringency by fostering access by previously underrepresented groups, reduce regulatory stringency by institutionalizing access by regulated industries, or have no effect. Using pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of state environmental compliance costs, this study investigates whether a variety of mechanisms designed to promote public access to administrative rulemaking affect the stringency of environmental regulation. The results suggest that mechanisms which provide direct access to rulemaking processes tend to decrease the aggressiveness of environmental regulation, but that this impact may be mitigated somewhat by increased public notification of agency rulemaking actions.
Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 31-Sept. 1, 2005, Washington DC.
|
| |
| |
|
|
Pluralism, Agency Autonomy, or Bureaucratic Capture: Public
Participation in State Agency Rulemaking
Neal D. Woods
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
University of South Carolina
neal.## email not listed ##
Abstract
A substantial body of legislation has emerged at all levels of government which installs
procedural mechanisms designed to promote public involvement in administrative
rulemaking. Depending upon the literature one consults, one could come to the
conclusion that these procedures should enhance regulatory stringency by fostering
access by previously underrepresented groups, reduce regulatory stringency by
institutionalizing access by regulated industries, or have no effect. Using pooled cross-
sectional time-series analysis of state environmental compliance costs, this study
investigates whether a variety of mechanisms designed to promote public access to
administrative rulemaking affect the stringency of environmental regulation. The results
suggest that mechanisms which provide direct access to rulemaking processes tend to
decrease the aggressiveness of environmental regulation, but that this impact may be
mitigated somewhat by increased public notification of agency rulemaking actions.
Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 31-Sept. 1, 2005, Washington DC.
|
|
 Convention | | Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
Page 1 of 24 
