The Changing Parameters of Kurdish Statehood:
Between Brussels and Baghdad
Gareth Stansfield
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Introduction
‘They never could gain independence! The Turks would stop them!’ is the common
refrain heard when the notion of the emergence of a Kurdish state is mentioned,
whether in media, governmental, or academic circles. It is understandable why this
should be the case, after all the Turkish state, particularly when under the influence of
the military, has a long and distinguished history of combating Kurdish separatism
within its own borders, and has never feared to rattle its sabres against any Kurdish
group(s) based outside its borders which have been perceived as harbouring
secessionist tendencies.
Why the map of the Middle East does not have a Kurdish entity on it can be traced to
the creation of the state system in the region in the aftermath of World War One. It is
then a relatively straightforward task to construct an argument explaining why a
Kurdish state never emerged in the post-colonial era. The argument has two parts to it.
The first focuses upon the opposition to such a development from the states which
were home to sizeable Kurdish populations, and particularly Turkey. No state in the
world, after all, would voluntarily countenance its own territorial attenuation. The
second part of the argument would consider the inability of the Kurds to organize
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Gareth Stansfield is Lecturer in Middle East Politics in the Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies of the
University of Exeter. He is author of Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), and The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division? (co-
authored with Liam Anderson, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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