themselves (whether ‘inside’ each state, or across state boundaries) into a political
force capable of seriously executing a secessionist action, and then, perhaps, pursuing
an irredentist policy against their neighbours.
2
If the Kurds were ever organized
enough to have an independent state, so the orthodox theory goes, it is speculated that
Kurds across the region would aspire to join ‘Kurdistan’, resulting in at least a loss of
territory, if not the collapse of states including Turkey. The deputy head of the
Turkish military, General Ilker Basbug, demonstrated that these concerns are still very
much alive, at least among the military elite. Speaking about the situation in Kirkuk
before the Iraqi elections of January 2005, Basbug stated that:
‘Hundreds of thousands of Kurds migrated to Kirkuk and registered to
vote. . . this could make the results of the elections questionable. . . even
worse, these developments could threaten the territorial and political
unity of Iraq. We're worried that such a development would pose an
important security problem for Turkey. . . this could lead to an
independent Kurdish state’.
3
Ultimately, a secessionist movement needs to be able to control territory, and the fact
that an independent Kurdistan by definition could feasibly include large swathes of
Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian or Syrian land, has always served to focus minds in these states
to view Kurdish aspirations with undisguised animosity and antipathy. Until recent
years, I would argue, Basbug and his like-minded colleagues did not have too much to
concern them as there was little evidence that Kurds in Turkey or Iraq (or, indeed,
2
See, for example, Kemal Kirisçi, ‘Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of
Turkish Policy’, Middle East Review of International Affairs 8: 1 (March, 2004).
3
Cited in Selcan Hacaoglu, ‘Turkey Warns Kurds About Kirkuk Control’, Associated Press, 26
January 2005.
2
Convention