The United States, the International Criminal Court and Bilateral
Immunity Agreements: Explaining the Resistance of Weak States
and Consequences for American Foreign Policy
Lana Wylie
Yale University
lana.## email not listed ##
Abstract
The United States has adopted a number of measures to ensure that their citizens are not
subject to the International Criminal Court. Most significantly, the Bush administration has used
economic sanctions such as the termination of economic and military aid in order to coerce states
to sign bilateral immunity agreements (BIA). These agreements exempt Americans from
prosecution by the ICC. In many cases, this tactic has proven effective. Over ninety states have
signed such agreements. However, the decision by many Latin American and small Caribbean
states to refuse to sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States in the face of
intense opposition from the United States is remarkable.
This paper first addresses why these states have refused to sign an agreement in the face
of intense pressure. International Relations theory has difficulty accounting for states that act in
ways that are contrary to their material interests. Despite what the major theories of International
Relations would tell us to expect, these states make these choices because they are seeking more
abstract goals. Prestige is one of those goals and, in the case of the International Criminal Court
examined in this paper, explains why some small Caribbean states were willing to sacrifice their
immediate security and economic objectives to support the Court.
Second, this paper examines whether continued pressure by the United States in the form
of aid termination is worth the costs it is imposing on other American foreign policy goals. In
particular, the potential harm to US anti-narcotic efforts, democracy goals, and overall security is
substantial.
Prepared for delivery at the 2005 International Studies Association Meeting,
March 1-5, 2005
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