21
It would be a risk to precipitate a war with a more powerful country.
And yet, the president of Ecuador might well gamble that Ecuador could do no
worse than it had done in the past. The benefit would be to shore up his
popularity in Ecuador. Politicians such as Deputy Germán Mancheno thought
that, “This time there is a consensus and determination among the people to
settle this border problem once and for all. The civilians are prepared for
anything...meaning that if we become involved in a military conflict, civilian
society will support the Ecuadorian Army so our territorial rights are
respected.”
64
Ecuadoran news at the time (as reported by FBIS) about the war
repeatedly suggested that the war would bring unity. President Duran Ballén
made a point of inviting past presidents and ministers to meet with him on the
subject.
65
And Durán Ballén had another audience to consider: the four
"guarantors" to the Rio Protocol. Ecuador had to ensure the guarantor nations
to be sympathetic to its claims. As Mares points out, Ecuador had to get
international support for its cause, and had to get Peru to be seen as the
aggressor.
66
This helps explain why the war appeared almost accidental. Thus,
President Durán Ballén gave a speech on January 28, 1995, in which he stated,
“I want to categorically deny that we were the attackers.”
67
News reports
published by FBIS cite conflicting and confusing accounts of attacks on both
64
“Deputy Describes Situation,” Quito Voz de los Andes (January 27, 1995) provided by FBIS.
65
Described in “President Meets With Former Presidents, Announces New Clash, Quito Voz de
los Andes (January 28, 1995) <FBIS>
66
Mares, Violent Peace.
67
“President Meets With Former Presidents, Announces New Clash,” Quito Voz de los Andes
(January 28, 1995) <FBIS>
Convention