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the notion that hegemons promote stability. Furthermore, we cannot know how
many wars would have occurred in Latin America in the absence of U.S.
hegemony. However, the fact that this war occurred suggests that the U.S.,
even when it is an official “guarantor,” cannot guarantee peace. Furthermore,
the stated guarantee and promised involvement of the guarantors allowed
Ecuador to risk a war with a country twice its size and expect to survive the
conflict and even gain from it. Thus, Ecuador’s behavior was more risky than it
otherwise would have been. And yet, hegemony and the “guarantors” of the
Rio Protocol did not cause the war; furthermore, they have served an
important function in resolving conflicts between the two countries.
This paper concludes with a few observations and caveats. Even a
hegemon cannot prevent war and guarantee peace and security. They can, at
times, serve effectively as neutral mediating parties. They also can
inadvertently increase the risk of conflicts, as in this case. However, the
presence of a hegemon in and of itself does not trigger risky behavior;
underlying causes and domestic politics need to be considered.