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The Cost of Shame: International Organizations, Foreign Aid, and Human Rights Norms Enforcement
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IOs, Foreign Aid, and Human Rights Enforcement 3
account for what is otherwise an anomalous finding: compared to bilateral aid, multilateral aid appears more norm-abiding or altruistic in its targeting (e.g. Neumayer 2003b).
H
UMAN
R
IGHTS
N
ORMS
,
A
ID
G
IVING
,
AND
IO
S
Evidence abounds that governments internalize human rights norms by
incorporating them into their own domestic rights practices (e.g. Risse and Sikkink 1999). Yet, the social stigma of violating human rights norms is obviously insufficient to prevent widespread rights abuses. Many governments sign and ratify human rights treaties and then routinely violate them (e.g. Hathaway 2002). It is useful, then, to study the mechanisms that states use to reward compliance and sanction non-compliance with given rights standards, as well as the obstacles that impede the use and effectiveness of these mechanisms.
One plausible mechanism, in this regard, is bilateral aid.
1
By tying aid
to a candidate’s human rights standards, donor states can reward norm compliance and sanction norm violations. This mechanism is well appreciated in the literature. Scholars have long been interested in understanding whether and to what extent donor countries condition their aid allocations on the human rights and democratic practices of potential recipients. Most empirical studies on the subject focus on U.S. foreign aid (e.g., Abrams and Lewis, 1993; Apodaca and Stohl, 1999; Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Carleton and Stohl, 1987; Meernik et al. 1988; Poe, 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi, 1994; Poe et al., 1994), with mixed results. In general, they reveal that aid is more sensitive to a country’s political and civil liberties than personal integrity rights, and that economic aid, more than military aid, is influenced by rights considerations. But the significance of these effects is not robust to method, time-frame, and location. Studies on a broad range of donors also indicate that despite their self-proclaimed commitment to promote human rights, aid allocations are largely based on the political objectives of donors and, less so, on the economic needs of recipients and/or their rights practices (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2002; Lebovic 1988, 2005; Moon 1983, Neumayer 2003a, 2003b; Schraeder et al. 1998).
2
It appears then that aid is given as a “reward” to
countries (Moon 1983: 317-320) for their economic (e.g., trade), historical (e.g. colonial ties), political (e.g., UN voting), and military relevance (e.g., security ties) to the donor, not to reward or punish these countries for their domestic human rights performances.
1
An alternative is preferential trade agreements (see Hafner-Burton 2005).
2
There are some, smaller (mostly Scandinavian) countries for which human rights
records have a stronger relationship to aid-giving.
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| | Authors: Lebovic, James. and Voeten, Erik. |
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IOs, Foreign Aid, and Human Rights Enforcement 3
account for what is otherwise an anomalous finding: compared to bilateral
aid, multilateral aid appears more norm-abiding or altruistic in its targeting
(e.g. Neumayer 2003b).
H
UMAN
R
IGHTS
N
ORMS
,
A
ID
G
IVING
,
AND
IO
S
Evidence abounds that governments internalize human rights norms by
incorporating them into their own domestic rights practices (e.g. Risse and
Sikkink 1999). Yet, the social stigma of violating human rights norms is
obviously insufficient to prevent widespread rights abuses. Many
governments sign and ratify human rights treaties and then routinely violate
them (e.g. Hathaway 2002). It is useful, then, to study the mechanisms that
states use to reward compliance and sanction non-compliance with given
rights standards, as well as the obstacles that impede the use and
effectiveness of these mechanisms.
One plausible mechanism, in this regard, is bilateral aid.
1
By tying aid
to a candidate’s human rights standards, donor states can reward norm
compliance and sanction norm violations. This mechanism is well
appreciated in the literature. Scholars have long been interested in
understanding whether and to what extent donor countries condition their
aid allocations on the human rights and democratic practices of potential
recipients. Most empirical studies on the subject focus on U.S. foreign aid
(e.g., Abrams and Lewis, 1993; Apodaca and Stohl, 1999; Cingranelli and
Pasquarello, 1985; Carleton and Stohl, 1987; Meernik et al. 1988; Poe,
1992; Poe and Sirirangsi, 1994; Poe et al., 1994), with mixed results. In
general, they reveal that aid is more sensitive to a country’s political and
civil liberties than personal integrity rights, and that economic aid, more
than military aid, is influenced by rights considerations. But the
significance of these effects is not robust to method, time-frame, and
location. Studies on a broad range of donors also indicate that despite their
self-proclaimed commitment to promote human rights, aid allocations are
largely based on the political objectives of donors and, less so, on the
economic needs of recipients and/or their rights practices (e.g. Alesina and
Dollar 2002; Lebovic 1988, 2005; Moon 1983, Neumayer 2003a, 2003b;
Schraeder et al. 1998).
2
It appears then that aid is given as a “reward” to
countries (Moon 1983: 317-320) for their economic (e.g., trade), historical
(e.g. colonial ties), political (e.g., UN voting), and military relevance (e.g.,
security ties) to the donor, not to reward or punish these countries for their
domestic human rights performances.
1
An alternative is preferential trade agreements (see Hafner-Burton 2005).
2
There are some, smaller (mostly Scandinavian) countries for which human rights
records have a stronger relationship to aid-giving.
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