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"Burden-Sharing": The International Politics of Refugee Protection
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The ‘joint product model’ then has implications for both the efficiency (extent of under-provision) and the equity predictions of the Olson model. According to the joint-product model, the degree to which the particular good will be provided, can be expected to be less suboptimal than predicted in the ‘exploitation’ model.
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‘Because of the private
benefits obtained through joint products, national allocations to alliance military efforts tend to be somewhat higher than they would be in the pure public goods case’ (Boyer 1993: 21). Joint products offer stronger incentives for contributions than pure public goods. This stronger motivation is grounded in self-interest, i.e. the interest of creating jointly-produced private goods (Bobrow and Boyer 2005: 23). The ‘joint product model’ suggests that a country’s contributions to the provision of refugee protection (with its public and private characteristics) will be positively related to the proportion of excludable benefits accruing to that country. The greater the proportion of private benefits to overall benefits, the greater the incentive for individual states to contribute to the provision of an international collective good. I.e., the more excludable benefits occur for individual states, the more we would expect states to reveal their preferences, and the more limited the opportunities for free-riding. It is now widely recognized in the literature that there are few (if any) pure public goods. However, it is still the convention to speak of public goods (sometimes ‘impure public goods) if the goods in question have some significant ‘public’ component.
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Murdoch and Sandler (1982; 1984) found empirical support for the ‘joint-product’ hypothesis in the case
of NATO burden-sharing efforts in the 1960s and 70s.
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| | Authors: Thielemann, Eiko. |
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The ‘joint product model’ then has implications for both the efficiency (extent of under-
provision) and the equity predictions of the Olson model. According to the joint-product
model, the degree to which the particular good will be provided, can be expected to be
less suboptimal than predicted in the ‘exploitation’ model.
benefits obtained through joint products, national allocations to alliance military efforts
tend to be somewhat higher than they would be in the pure public goods case’ (Boyer
1993: 21). Joint products offer stronger incentives for contributions than pure public
goods. This stronger motivation is grounded in self-interest, i.e. the interest of creating
jointly-produced private goods (Bobrow and Boyer 2005: 23). The ‘joint product model’
suggests that a country’s contributions to the provision of refugee protection (with its
public and private characteristics) will be positively related to the proportion of
excludable benefits accruing to that country. The greater the proportion of private
benefits to overall benefits, the greater the incentive for individual states to contribute to
the provision of an international collective good. I.e., the more excludable benefits occur
for individual states, the more we would expect states to reveal their preferences, and the
more limited the opportunities for free-riding. It is now widely recognized in the
literature that there are few (if any) pure public goods. However, it is still the convention
to speak of public goods (sometimes ‘impure public goods) if the goods in question have
some significant ‘public’ component.
6
Murdoch and Sandler (1982; 1984) found empirical support for the ‘joint-product’ hypothesis in the case
of NATO burden-sharing efforts in the 1960s and 70s.
8
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