(Page 2 of 17) - The Chechen Conflict: Securitisation or Normalisation? authored by Renz, Bettina.

words of Buzan et al. ‘enough resonance for a platform [has] to be made from which
it is possible to legitimise emergency measures or other steps that would not have
been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threat, point of no
return and necessity’.

The securitisation approach provides a useful addition to the democratic

transition model, which has been commonly applied to the study of political processes
under way in Russia throughout much of the post-Soviet era. Whilst the proposition of
an additional model is not intended to deny the merits of the transition approach per
se, securitisation can provide a more nuanced explanation particularly of the view
held by many observers that Russia under the Putin leadership is moving into a more
authoritarian direction. At its crudest, transition theory is essentially predicated on a
teleological linear dynamic, and through much of the immediate post-Soviet period
major policy decisions in Russia were viewed in this light by a number of western
policy-makers and academics, who assessed each development in terms of its effect
on progress towards or retraction away from a consolidated market democracy. In
contrast, we hold that it is too simplistic to argue either that contemporary Russia is
democratic, or that it is not. In assessing securitisation attempts and their respective
success in particular policy areas, the securitisation model does not start from the
presumption of an authoritarian edge to policy making in contemporary Russia. As
such, securitisation can explain how particular areas of Russian policy have become
more authoritarian in recent years and how other areas have been less susceptible to
this shift. In this sense, securitisation provides a point of departure from the
‘democratic/undemocratic’ bifurcation inherent in the transition approach. The model
provides an explanation for apparent authoritarian moves which does not necessarily
require a rejection of democratisation and marketisation in the medium term, in that it
places the rationale and justification for the adoption or rejection of particular policies
outside the democratic/undemocratic bifurcation. Political actors may support one
securitising move and reject another without this necessarily leading to a sense of
confusion over whether they belong to the democratic camp or not. Furthermore, the
securitisation of an issue can be framed as limited temporally (as is the case with the
securitisation of the Chechen conflict discussed in this paper), thereby making it
easier for those who broadly support democratic normality to justify backing a
particular securitising move.

In addition to providing new nuances to analyses of Russian policy-making,

the securitisation approach provides a comparative tool different from that employed
by transition theorists, when Russia was compared – always unfavourably – against
the long-standing market-democratic achievements of western countries, or even
against a list of criteria to which few democratic states could measure up.
Comparisons of this nature had a tendency to be counterproductive in that they were
perceived in Russia to be based on hegemonic notions of democratisation, and to
belittle a great power. Instead, securitisation places Russia within a context familiar
internationally at a time when reconciliation of the competing demands of freedom
and security is a common dilemma across many states. Indeed, as also discussed in
the case of the Chechen conflict below, since the terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington on 11 September 2001, the balance between security and ‘normal’
politics, between rights and freedoms, has been an increasingly pertinent and central
issue in many countries, perhaps particularly in the United States and the United
Kingdom.

Buzan et al., Security, p. 25

For a fuller account of the securitisation framework in application to contemporary Russia see chapter

one in E Bacon and B Renz, Securitising Russia.