(Page 2 of 12) - India as a Maritime Power? authored by Winner, Andrew.

Working Draft – Please do not cite without permission of the author

In June 2004, India issued the first formal maritime doctrine since independence. The
doctrine builds upon the Indian Navy's (IN) first Strategic Defense Review, an internal
IN effort undertaken in 1998. That it took fifty years to have a strategic review for the
Indian Navy and another six to formulate a doctrine tells part of the story of why India
has not become a significant maritime power even in its own region or a global political-
military entity with which to be reckoned. However, this is all in the process of changing
very rapidly.

The end of the Cold War, India's detonation of six nuclear weapons in 1998, its rapid
economic growth, and its increased willingness to view and use its military power as a
legitimate tool to advance its national interests mean that much more attention must be
paid to India's military strategies, doctrines, and capabilities, in Asia and beyond. India's
strategic defense review identifies four major roles for the Indian Navy: sea-based
deterrence, economic and energy security, forward presence, and naval diplomacy.

Each

of these roles is broad and in keeping with traditional roles assigned to navies of medium
to large states with maritime interests and capabilities. However, depending on how New
Delhi chooses to carry out these roles, it could have significant consequences for the
security and stability of what India regards as its own waterway – the Indian Ocean
region – and beyond. In carrying out these roles and associated missions, India’s Navy
will interact more extensively with Asian navies small (Singapore, Pakistan) and large
(China, Japan) as well as the maritime forces of the United States and European states.

This paper will be organized around these four self-identified roles for the Indian Navy.
Each will be examined as described by significant documents, people, and institutions in
India. Specifically, each role will be examined in terms of current capabilities, future
capabilities and an associated acquisition strategy, roadblocks and challenges to acquiring
future capabilities, current and future operations/exercises, limitations, hurdles,
unexpected consequences, and potential interactions that development of these roles will
bring with other Asian navies.

Enduring Challenges

The Indian Navy has faced three significant challenges since its founding that have
constrained its ability to reach its full potential as a potent and flexible instrument of
national power. The first is India’s colonial legacy. On the one hand, India benefited from
the historical connection to and legacy of the world’s most successful navy – the Royal
Navy. Indian naval officers were able to be educated and train in Royal Navy institutions
immediately following independence, allowing New Delhi to develop a cadre of capable
officers more rapidly had they had to rely on a purely indigenous program that was built
from scratch beginning in 1948. British officers in charge of the Royal Indian Navy
leading up to and during World War II also began, along with their Indian counterparts,
to prepare the way for a maritime service for an independent India. On the other, the
partition of British India made for the division of the RIN into two navies was
devastating for the service. The RIN was ethnically integrated to a much greater degree
than the army, resulting in the disintegration of cohesive units as well as the splitting of
platforms and infrastructure. Early planning for IN roles and resulting capabilities also
carried with it the influence of British desires related to Cold War contingencies. Early
IN requests to the UK for assistance showed a divided set of views – with the British

Working Draft – Please do not cite without permission of the author