role within it. Though a late-comer in the field of International Relations,
neoconservatism should be no stranger to students of international relations, as it is
closely related to two predominant international theories: realism and liberalism. In
some way, by advocating the pursuit of broad liberal goals by realist means,
neoconservatism is a synthesis of both theories. Given this overlapping with both
liberalism and realism, the term ‘neocons’ will be loosely used in this paper as a
continuum to include not only ‘die-hard’ neocons such as Paul Wolfowitz and John
Bolton, but also their close allies such as hardline realists Dick Cheney and Donald
Rumsfeld.
Some similarities with realism and liberalism notwithstanding, neoconservatism is
nevertheless a distinctive school of thought. For instance, it dismisses as too narrow or
cynical the realist definition of (America’s) national interests as power. Believing in a
sort of Wilsonian internationalism, it argues that promoting democracy and freedom is
also in America’s fundamental interests. Yet, despite this strong Wilsonian idealism,
the neocons disagree with liberal internationalists over how to achieve such goals.
Seeing liberal internationalists’ reliance on diplomacy and international institutions as
misguided, the neocons place more emphasis on America’s military might. Thus, moral
clarity and military strength constitute the dual foundation of neoconservatives’ grand
strategy for the United States in world affairs.
This neoconservative grand strategy is best articulated by the neoconservative talking-
heads William Kristol and Robert Kagan (1996). In their influential Foreign Affairs
article: ‘Toward a neo-Reaganite foreign policy’, they set forth a neoconservative vision
of America’s international role in terms of ‘benevolent global hegemony’. To achieve
and maintain this role, they argued that the United States needed “a neo-Reaganite
foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence” (Kristol and Kagan 1996:
23). Ronald Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy towards the Soviet Union impressed
them as being primarily responsible for the demise of the ‘Evil Empire’ and the winning
of the Cold War by the U.S.-led West, and they believed that a neo-Reaganite foreign
policy should continue in the post-Cold War era.
Among other things, this neo-Reaganite foreign policy advocates preserving and
expanding U.S. military pre-eminence, promoting and exporting democracy and
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