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INTRODUCTION
During the initial half of the twentieth century, American society witnessed a steadily
increasing divorce rate, which escalated dramatically around 1967, peaked to an all time high in
1980, and after declining slightly, has now assumed a plateau (Casper and Bianchi, 2002; White,
1990). Concern about the causes and consequence of the “decline of the American family” led
researchers to postulate numerous theories to explain the fluctuating “phenomenon” of marital
dissolution. Some associate divorce with growing individualism and secularization of society
(Lesthaeghe, 1995). Others argue that women’s increasing labor force participation and
educational attainment gives them the autonomy to terminate unsatisfactory marriages or
relationships (Becker, 1981; Ruggles, 1997). On the other hand, policy-makers assert that laxity
of divorce law reforms initiated in 1973—i.e. the move from the “fault” to the “no fault”
unilateral laws—have made marital dissolution convenient and accessible (Gray and Vanderhart,
2000). Finally, personal failings and shortcomings (such as alcoholism, domestic abuse, etc) as
well as educational and wage differences between spouses are posited to result in “irreconcilable
differences” at the individual or micro level (Teachman, 2002).
Although these studies are insightful in their delineation of relevant predictors of divorce,
they gloss over why some groups (particularly high school dropouts and blacks) are more
“vulnerable” to marital disruption than others. Consequently, researchers retrained their lens on
larger impersonal economic changes in American society that juxtaposed divorce, that is
increasing affluence in the 1960s, followed by widening income inequality and stagnating wages
from the early 1970s onwards (Farley, 1996). Since the 1980s, the distribution of earnings has
polarized, causing a significant erosion of the middle class and the creation of a disadvantaged
underclass comprised of single-parent families, minorities, etc. (Blau 1998; McLanahan and
Convention