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Institutional Isomorphism and Interorganizational Conflict: A Theory of Rogue Organizations
Marisa R. Friedman
Stony Brook University
The concept of institutional isomorphism, as presented by Powell and DiMaggio, sheds
light on the social, economic and cultural processes that result in organizations looking and
functioning similarly. However, the tripartite schema of institutional isomorphism Powell and
DiMaggio present is ambiguous and static. This paper seeks clarify the process of coercive
isomorphism by examining how various institutional pressures exert constraint on organizations,
creating conflict when one or more organizations, which I call rogues, deviates from normative
and cultural standards. In this paper, I shall use the labor union the Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW) as a case study, to examine the relationship between institutional constraint and
interorganizational conflict due to rogue organizations.
Theoretical Background
Neo-institutionalism concentrates on why organizations remain stable and similar in
structure and function. This paper is inspired by Powell and DiMaggio’s article “The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”
(1991:63-82). While population ecologists and resource dependence theorists focus on
competitive isomorphism, neo-institutionalists focus primarily on aspects of institutional
isomorphism. According to neoinstitutionalists, isomorphic pressures are “the forces pressing
communities toward accommodation with the outside world” (66). Expanding on this definition,
Powell and DiMaggio constructed a tripartite model of institutional isomorphism. The three
parts are coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. “Coercive isomorphism [often] results
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