A Deterrence Model of Candidate Positioning and Electoral Competition: An Alternative
to the Spatial Voting Model with Ideological Candidates and Partisan Voters
Justin Buchler
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Case Western Reserve University
222 Mather House
Cleveland, OH 44106
Justin.## email not listed ##
(216) 368-2646
Abstract
This paper offers a new conceptual framework for thinking about competitive elections and
candidate positioning. Current candidate positioning models are almost uniformly based on spatial
voting assumptions for the electorate. This paper examines what happens when we remove this
ubiquitous but highly controversial assumption in favor of the assumption that voters are partisans.
Under those circumstances, candidate positioning becomes a deterrence-based game in which
incumbents do not moderate to defeat opponents-- they moderate to dissuade opponents from
challenging them. When they face opponents, it is because they did not moderate. In addition to
the inherent benefits of relaxing a controversial assumption, the deterrence model makes several
important predictions that are more accurate than corresponding predictions of the spatial voting
model. The deterrence model also has important implications for political reforms aimed at
increasing competition in congressional elections. Specifically, promoting competitive elections by
promoting challenger entry is likely to have perverse consequences by increasing ideological
polarization in Congress
I would like to thank Donald Green, Eric Schickler and Scot Schraufnagel for their helpful
comments on this paper.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago, IL.
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