Two of the most pressing issues on the international agenda today are the
nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. The first has already withdrawn from
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and recently conducted an apparently
successful test of a small nuclear device. The second has recently been referred
to United Nations Security Council for their substantial non-compliance with the
NPT’s provisions and yet has still pressed ahead with mastering the nuclear fuel
cycle- the process of converting non-fissile uranium into enriched uranium which,
depending on the level of enrichment will be suitable for either electricity
generation or weapons production.
The foreign policy aims of the United States, Europe, Russia and China
appear to be focused on preventing both nations from either acquiring nuclear
weapons- or in the North Korean case, from maintaining their current stockpile.
In both cases, the international community is seeking a diplomatic means to
allow legitimate nuclear power generating activities to proceed in both nations but
without the concomitant risk that nuclear material will be enriched (in the case of
uranium) or separated (in the case of plutonium) in such a way could be useful
for bomb making.
To date, the efforts of the international community have been based on
the idea of finding the appropriate mix of incentives such as subsidized reactors
in the case of N. Korea or full handling of nuclear fuels by an approved nuclear
power in the case of Iran, which will convince both countries to cooperate with
the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This approach
1
Though it is acknowledged that N. Korea may in fact already posses a small number of
rudimentary devices.
2
Convention