(Page 1 of 28) - Chinese Perspectives on Terrorism and Human Rights authored by Otto, Lee Ann.

Chinese Perspectives on Terrorism and Human Rights

(Draft Paper)

Lee Ann Otto

University of San Diego

E-mail: ## email not listed ##

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Convention of the ISA, Chicago, Illinois

February 28-March 3, 2007

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush

called on the world to join with the United States in a “war on terrorism.” The People’s
Republic of China (PRC) was one of many states who answered this call. China’s
response led it to play an enhanced role in international anti-terror and security
discussions. Of equal, or even greater significance, however, was the opportunity the war
on terror provided China in dealing with domestic problems. China’s continued support
has had implications not only for its relations with other states, but also for the
relationship between the Chinese government and its people. This relationship was
evident in China’s early statements regarding the war on terror in which international
attention was focused on what China identified as the immediate terrorist threat posed by
Uygher separatism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR or Xinjiang).
China called on all states to support it in taking strong action against terrorists within
China as part of the international anti-terrorist effort.

Since 2001, China has continued to use the war on terror both to frame its policies

and to gain international acquiescence for its actions in Xinjiang with some success.
China’s use of the war on terror in Xinjiang in this manner is not unique. As noted by
researchers at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in
Singapore, many countries facing internal threats have chosen to link their own domestic
problems with the larger war on terror (Gunaratna 1). What is noteworthy here is that in
articulating its position on terrorism in Xinjiang, China has been careful to establish a
broad conception of terrorism that could ultimately allow it to use its support for the
international war on terrorism to justify forceful action against a broad range of activities
by its own citizens. As stated by Joshua Kurlantzich, “the [Chinese] government
manipulates the war on terrorism and other supposed security threats to crack down on
aggrieved citizens whom it cannot co-opt and on groups … that try to form national
networks – the kinds of networks that make Communist Party officials feel vulnerable”
(Kurlantzick, “China’s” 436).

This study examines how China has used its support for the international war on

terrorism both to cope with an immediate domestic problem and to lay an internationally
sanctioned basis for dealing with future instability. It focuses first on China’s policies in
Xinjiang and its post 9/11 use of the war on terrorism to gain validation for these actions.
It then focuses more specifically on the rationale China created to frame its actions in
Xinjiang demonstrating how China established a broad conception of terrorism that can
be used to justify taking strong action to cope with a range of future domestic challenges.
China’s ultimate goal is to continue to be able to use the banner of the war on terrorism to
curtail international criticism of its domestic policies and specifically, charges of human
rights abuses.