(Page 2 of 28) - Chinese Perspectives on Terrorism and Human Rights authored by Otto, Lee Ann.

Xinjiang: 1949-2001

Problems between the Chinese government and the peoples of northwestern China

predate the establishment of the PRC in 1949. China’s Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)
annexed the region in 1759 and named it Xinjiang (meaning “New Frontier” or “New
Territory”) (Starr, “Introduction” 6). Just over 100 years later, in 1865, Yakub Beg, a
local chieftain, called for independence and initiated an uprising against Chinese rule.
“Although finally defeated in 1877, Beg’s campaign set a precedent by calling for
Uyghur independence based on appeals to religion and ethnicity” (Chung, “China’s” 9).
Separatist sentiments in Xinjiang continued after the fall of the Qing Dynasty sparking
several uprisings. These met with a measure of success from 1931-1934 and again from
1944-1949 when the Uyghurs, along with other local Muslim groups, established two
separate regimes, both named the Eastern Turkestan Republic (Chung, “China’s” 9).
While the government of the PRC has managed to prevent further successful secessionist
movements in Xinjiang, the process has not been easy.

Why has the Chinese government expended so much political and economic

energy to keep this fairly isolated and desolate region of approximately 18 million people
part of the PRC? Apart from the obvious and extremely important issue of maintaining
the territorial integrity of the Chinese homeland, there are also significant economic and
strategic issues that come into play. Economically while a large part of Xinjiang is
desert, the area produces approximately one third of China’s cotton supply and
“explorations in the Tarim Basin have revealed [China’s] largest oil and gas reserves”
(Chung, “China’s” 10; Liu 22). China is currently building a 2,600 mile pipeline to
connect Lunnan in Xinjiang with Shanghai. (Pocha). Xinjiang is also the home of
China’s nuclear testing facilities (Starr, “Introduction” 3).

Just as significant as Xinjiang’s economic potential in China’s thinking is its

geopolitical location. With 5,600 km of international borders, Xinjiang adjoins eight
countries, three of which are nuclear powers and five of which are largely Muslim
(Becquelin 359; Starr, “Introduction” 3). This region provides China with “a useful
springboard for projecting Chinese influence abroad” (Chung, “China’s” 10). The area
was also the historical center of trade along the Silk Road connecting China with Central
Asia and the Middle East. Xinjiang’s importance to China has increased over time due
to many factors including the expansion of transborder economic ties. In essence, “[t]he
PRC has invested so much in, and so much depends on, Xinjiang that the regime will do
what it must to retain undisputed control over this vast region” (Bachman 157).

The primary challenge to Chinese control and stability in Xinjiang comes from

the Uyghur population. The Uyghurs are Turkic-speaking Muslims who in 1949 made up
the majority of the population in Xinjiang. By 2000, due partially to explicit
governmental policies discussed below, this number had decreased to one half of the
population (Rossabi 14). This decline has not dampened the call for the establishment of
an independent state, East Turkistan, by a segment of the Uyghur population (Rossabi
15). As mentioned above, conflict between the Chinese government and separatists in
Xinjiang goes back hundreds of years. Historically, like today, challenges to Chinese
rule have been based on a desire to preserve Uyghur cultural identity and independence in
the face of foreign (Han) domination. However exacerbating these factors have been the
consequences (some intended and some unintended) of Chinese policies aimed at the
general transformation of Chinese society and the economy. Here “the government’s
own program for change has generated what might be called its own social antibodies in