Traditionally, political scientists have tended to see the powerful presidency of the
20
th
and 21
st
centuries as the enemy of strong parties. (See Davis 1992; Milkis 1993,
1999; Jones 2002; Greenstein 1978). Through an “objective” media, presidents appeal
directly to voters, over the heads of party leaders, seeking a non-partisan image. They
build ad hoc coalitions of support in Congress without regard to party lines. They preside
over an executive branch staffed by non-partisan experts, more interested in policy than
politics. Presidents show little interest in their party’s performance in down-ballot races,
let along its long-term fate. All of these propositions held true for presidents of the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, especially Eisenhower, Johnson and Carter. But since 1980, we
have seen the rise of a new kind of presidency – a Partisan Presidency. And George W.
Bush has brought this partisanship to a new extreme – perhaps to the point when practice
becomes pathology.
“Partisan Presidents” have polarized the electorate along partisan lines to an
extent unimaginable a generation ago, often experiencing an “approval gap” of 40 points
or more. (The “approval gap” is the difference between the approval given to a president
by his partisans, as opposed to that given by members of the other party). Relatively few
members of the other party have voted for them.
“Partisan Presidents” have received overwhelming support in Congress from their
party. More notably, they have confronted strong – sometimes near-unanimous –
opposition from the other party. They have often relied heavily on their party’s
leadership to deliver votes on Capitol Hill, and they have been unable to enjoy the cozy
relationship that earlier presidents had with the opposition, e.g. Eisenhower and Sam
1
Convention