APSA Paper
Economic Interdependence and Alliance Reliability: How
does International Trade Affect Alliance Commitments in
Koji Kagotani
Department of Political Scinece, UCLA
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Please do not cite without the author’s permission.
Summary:
This paper investigates economic interdependence and alliance reliability. I explain how
international trade affects the violation of alliance commitments in crises. Trade has both
an endogenous and exogenous nature. Trade flows are affected by security concerns, while
trade generates domestic political cleavages that constrain governmental policy choices. I
interpret trade sensitivity and vulnerability focusing on governmental incentives, the
general interest and special interest models. With statistical methods, I examine whether
trade affected by security concerns generates domestic political cleavages in the period
1816-1944 that, in turn, affect alliance violations. The results do not sufficiently answer
the research question. However, the results do provide a very clear policy implication. A
state’s vulnerability to trade decreases its rate of treaty violation. Controlling bilateral
trade and establishing preferential trade agreements are helpful for constraining alliance
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This paper is prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, August 30thSeptember 2nd, 2007