(Page 1 of 10) - The Future of Intelligence Co-operation between Military Forces and Private Security Companies based on Lessons Learned in Iraq authored by Strachan-Morris, David.

The Future of Civil-Military Intelligence Co-operation Based on Lessons

Learned in Iraq

David Strachan-Morris

This paper will analyze the lessons learned during the creation of the intelligence
interface between the military and Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Iraq, under
the auspices of the Department of Defense (DoD) or Department of State (DoS), and
argue that such an interface needs to be created for future operations where the
military is conducting reconstruction or nation-building operations. This is especially
important in light of current DoD focus on unconventional warfare and nation-
building. Recent doctrinal documents such as DoD Directive 3000.05, Military
Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, and
National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts
concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, recognize the need for co-operation with
a wide range of actors in future operations. An important element of this will be the
sharing of security-related information to enhance the situational awareness of those
other actors. Since PSCs are increasingly likely to be present in many future
conflicts, even if they are not directly supporting the military to the extent they are at
the moment, the problems encountered in Iraq will recur unless there is a sound
framework for intelligence co-operation with the military based on mutual
understanding and recognition of common aims.

The Establishment of the Reconstruction Operations

Centers in Iraq

On 1 May 2003, President Bush declared that major hostilities in Iraq had ceased.
Regardless of whether or not his statement was correct, the end of the ground
offensive precipitated the start of the reconstruction of the country. Unfortunately, the
reconstruction effort rapidly became a victim of the nascent insurgency that increased
in scale and tempo between May 2003 and the middle of 2007. The worsening
security situation led to an increase in the use of Private Security Companies.
Whoever the client and whatever the mission, every PSC had the same requirement;
an accurate picture of the threat in order to allow them to move around the country as
safely as possible.

PSCs operating under DoD or DoS contracts were able to obtain intelligence from
military units, but this was somewhat piecemeal and reliant on personal relationships
to a large extent. US citizens with extant security clearances clearly had an advantage
over other nationals, including British, Australians, and a large number of South
Africans. Relationships between military units and contractors also relied on physical
location. US Army officers reported that PSCs operating within their battlespace
would coordinate movements and build up intelligence sharing relationships but PSCs
that were just passing through or coming into the area from outside often did not. In
many cases the unit would only become aware of the presence of a PSC if an incident
occurred. Attitudes on both sides also varied widely, with some military units content
to cooperate with PSCs and others decidedly less so

. These attitudes clearly affected

the flow of intelligence, as some units refused to provide information to contractors,
seeing them as little more than mercenaries.

General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees GAO-05-737; Rebuilding Iraq:

Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Contractors. Washington DC, July 2005.

David Strachan-Morris

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09/04/2008