(Page 2 of 27) - An Asian Triangle: India’s Relationship with China and Japan authored by Roehrig, Terence.

Introduction

Much of the work done on Asia’s future has centered on China’s rise and the degree to

which this will generate conflict in the region. In particular, many studies have examined the

likelihood of a U.S.-Sino rivalry in Asia and globally.

This debate has also mirrored a debate

among international relations theorists regarding which of the two dominant theories

—realism

and liberal internationalism— best explain Asia’s likely future.

Some have also argued that

neither of these theories is sufficient so that different theoretical frameworks are needed to

explain the region.

An increasingly prominent part of these debates is the role a rising India will play in the

future security and economic structure of Asia. The U.S. National Intelligence Council report

Mapping the Global Future that attempts to project global trends out to 2020 notes:

the likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise
of Germany in the 19

century and the United States in the early 20

century—will

transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the
previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the
‘American Century,’ the early 21

century may be seen as the time when some in the

developing world, led by China and India, come into their own.

John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160-162; Denny

Roy, “The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 758-771; Robert S. Ross,
“Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 33-44; David Shambaugh,
“Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Autumn
1996): 180-209; Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?,” International
Security 30, no. 2 (October 2005): 7-45; Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Constrainment of China,” International
Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107-135.

Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.) Chinese

Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 2004): 3.

Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3

(Winter 1993/94): 5-33; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the
Cold War,” International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace:
East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81-119; Sujian Guo (ed.)
China’s “Peaceful Rise in the 21

st”

Century (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006); .

David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: the Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4

(Spring 2003): 57-85; Henry R. Nau, “Identity and the Balance of Power in Asia” in G. John Ikenberry and Michael
Mastanduno (eds.) International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press,
2003): 213-241; Thomas U. Berger, “Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Contructivist Interpretation,” in G.
John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003): 387-419.

National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020

Project (December 2004): 47, available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf, accessed January 18, 2008.