Author's Keywords: federalism, ethnic conflict, intrastate violence, state failure, post conflict reconstruction, international norms	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p254328_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Zellman, Ariel. "Ethnic Violence, International Norms, and Federalism: Domestic Problems and International Solutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p254328_index.html>

Zellman, A. D. , 2008-03-26 "Ethnic Violence, International Norms, and Federalism: Domestic Problems and International Solutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA Online <PDF>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p254328_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Given the character of federalism as a political system of shared sovereignty and divided autonomy between a central government and territorially defined constituent units, it is altogether unsurprising that federalism is often proposed as an institutional basis for political reconstruction in countries emerging from violent intrastate ethnic conflict. While the origins of federalism in each case do not entirely determine performative outcomes, it does seem likely that the conditions under which federalism is selected will have some explanatory influence on its persistence. It is the contention of this paper that while the literature has explored and developed in great detail the functions of federalism and the domestic political origins of its institutions, it has largely neglected the analysis of international factors conditioning its selection. Accounting for these pressures is important not only because domestically negotiated institutional arrangements have been found to persist and perform better on the whole than those which are externally imposed, but because the external environment may actually constrain the range of policy options open to political actors forcing them to select potentially suboptimal governing structures that fail to address root causes of domestic conflict. With a focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Sudan, this paper finds that although factors such as ethnic demography, territorial distribution of populations, and the on-the-ground political realities post-conflict make federalism a seemingly logical point for negotiation, it is international norms regarding human rights and state territorial integrity coupled with the depth of international involvement in the particular conflict which pushes other options off the table.

Creating and Maintaining a European Security Institution: Distribution of Power, International Norms and Domestic Political Parties

The Journey of Intellectual Property Rights Protection under Central-locality conflicts_x000d_--An Examination of the Influence of International Economic Institutions on Domestic Politics

EU Federalism and the New Members from Central and Eastern Europe: Institutional Impact upon National Political Systems and Governance