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Formateur Advantage in Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Institutions
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PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION AS LEADERSHIP STRATEGY
INTRA-PARTY ALLOCATION IN JAPAN
Yoshikuni Ono
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
Abstract
The single party government of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan is the result of an agreement between highly institutionalized factions, and portfolios of cabinet ministries are allocated among factions within the party. How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within a party? Do factions work in the same way as coalition parties do? My study shows that the allocation mechanism within a party is different. Drawing on data from portfolio allocations of the LDP government between 1960 and 2006, I demonstrate that the prime minister uses portfolio allocation as an instrument to deal with pressures from other factions. In particular, the prime minister as a party leader is concerned with challenges by internal rivals, who also want to become a party leader. To prevent his rivals from being united to challenge against him, he strategically allocates cabinet portfolios among factions. Therefore, the portfolio share is not solely determined by the faction’s seat share; depending on whether the prime minister is a popular figure among voters and whether he has a strong support base within the party, he changes the allocation of portfolios among factions. In the LDP government, the prime minister’s faction takes fewer portfolios as the chance of leadership challenge increases.
I would like to thank Yukio Maeda for sharing his data on public opinion polls conducted in Japan. I also would like to thank Arthur Lupia, William R. Clark, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Orit Kedar, Kenichi Ariga, and seminar participants at the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their comments on earlier drafts.
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1
PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION AS LEADERSHIP STRATEGY
INTRA-PARTY ALLOCATION IN JAPAN
Yoshikuni Ono
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
Abstract
The single party government of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan is the result of an
agreement between highly institutionalized factions, and portfolios of cabinet ministries are
allocated among factions within the party. How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work
within a party? Do factions work in the same way as coalition parties do? My study shows that
the allocation mechanism within a party is different. Drawing on data from portfolio allocations
of the LDP government between 1960 and 2006, I demonstrate that the prime minister uses
portfolio allocation as an instrument to deal with pressures from other factions. In particular, the
prime minister as a party leader is concerned with challenges by internal rivals, who also want to
become a party leader. To prevent his rivals from being united to challenge against him, he
strategically allocates cabinet portfolios among factions. Therefore, the portfolio share is not
solely determined by the faction’s seat share; depending on whether the prime minister is a
popular figure among voters and whether he has a strong support base within the party, he
changes the allocation of portfolios among factions. In the LDP government, the prime minister’s
faction takes fewer portfolios as the chance of leadership challenge increases.
I would like to thank Yukio Maeda for sharing his data on public opinion polls conducted in Japan. I also
would like to thank Arthur Lupia, William R. Clark, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Orit Kedar, Kenichi Ariga,
and seminar participants at the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their
comments on earlier drafts.
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