which’s (Worumillen, hou heneka). This discussion, then, is not meant to recapitulate Aristotle’s
analysis of technē; instead, it is meant to strike a fatal blow to the traditional picture of technē as
autonomous. After all, our activities make no sense outside of the bounds of praxis. Contra
theorists like Taminaux, who see in Heidegger’s thought an oblivion of praxis, perhaps it is the
case that Heidegger draws on Aristotle to being developing his own, original phenomenology of
practice?
This is not a question I’ve attempted to answer in this paper. It is, though, a thought with
which political theorists must come to terms. It is clear that Heidegger’s discussion of being-in-
the-world in Division One of Being and Time has drawn extensively one Aristotle’s analysis of
phronēsis and, for that reason, Heidegger cannot be read as a thinker who has, in a traditional
manner, privileged producing over acting and, in turn, distorted the phenomenon of action;
instead, it may be that Heidegger offers a competing vision of what praxis means in the modern
world. This issue can only be decided by a further look at the ways in which Heidegger’s
analysis of phronēsis continues to guide the whole of Being and Time.
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Convention