Author's Keywords: Uncertainty, split-ticket vote, elections, Mexico	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p140439_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Morales, Marco. "Split-Ticket Voting: The Uncertainty Hypothesis. Evidence from the 2006 Mexican Election" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 20, 2006 <Not Available>. 2008-12-12 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p140439_index.html>

Morales, M. A. , 2006-04-20 "Split-Ticket Voting: The Uncertainty Hypothesis. Evidence from the 2006 Mexican Election" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2008-12-12 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p140439_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Split-ticket voting has been seldom analyzed in Mexican elections. Evidence shows that about 20% of the electorate engaged in some type of split-ticket voting, and suggests that it might have played a role in Vicente Fox's victory in 2000. This paper seeks to address this question and shed light on some relevant questions. Why did such a large proportion of Mexican voters split their tickets on this particular election? What were the motivations behind their decision? Were they only seeking to oust PRI? Were they seeking to balance government? Or did they just simply knew one presidential candidate better than the others? To answer them, I review the literature and group the explanations in three general hypotheses: the Madisonian hypotheses (i.e. voters split their vote to insure checks and balances in government or to achieve some policy balance), the Expected Utility Maximization hypothesis (i.e. voters will reward the candidate with the highest expected utility differential based on economic performance), and the Relative Uncertainty hypothesis (i.e. voters will split their ticket when they are less uncertain about the positions of a party and about the traits of a candidate from a different party). I derive seven Implications from them and test them using survey data from the 2000 Mexican election. The evidence supports the Expected Utility maximization and the Relative Uncertainty hypotheses, but it fails to support any Madisonian motivations in the electorate.

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Electoral Politics and Vote Cleavages in a New Democracy: Split Ticket Voting in Nicaragua's 2006 Presidential Election

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