|
|
|
|
The Effects of Case Selection, Judge Ideology, and Institutional Structure in Tort Litigation in State Supreme Courts |
|
| Abstract | Word Stems | Keywords | Association | Citation | Get this Document | Similar Titles |
|
STOP! You can now view the document associated with this citation by clicking on the "View Document as HTML" link below. |
|
Click here to view the document
|
Abstract:
|
There are two enormously influential perspectives on courts that offer fundamentally different predictions about court outcomes and the effects of judge ideology on those outcomes. Well-known to political scientists studying courts, the ideological voting (VI) literature argues that judge ideology is a strong predictor of court outcomes and that those outcomes should be proximate to the policy preferences of courts. Less known to political scientists but highly influential, the law and economics perspective (LE) focuses on settlement behavior of litigants who try to minimize costs and thus estimate likely outcomes in court, and settle pre-trial, simpler cases. Because of this case selection process, only complex or difficult cases make it to trial with win-rates coalescing at fifty percent for plaintiffs or defendants. From this perspective, litigant strategies cancel out the effects of judge ideology and the court outcomes do not correspond to judges’ ideological preferences. We reconcile these perspectives by examining tort cases in state supreme courts from 1995 through 1998. The contrasting perspectives stem from the fundamental institutional processes upon which each perspective is based. The LE perspective dominates in states without lower appellate courts. The process of appeal in state supreme courts without discretionary dockets is litigant-driven, with win-rates hovering at fifty percent and deviations from that norm accounted for by forces influencing litigant uncertainty. The ideological voting predicted by the VI literature occurs primarily in the context of state supreme court strategic reversals of lower appellate court decisions---a process commensurate that operating with the U.S. Supreme Court. When it comes to judicial outcomes, institutional structure is a critical element shaping the influence of litigants and judge ideology. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
court (255), case (131), state (121), ideolog (113), litig (103), suprem (81), judg (70), outcom (66), percent (62), lower (61), appel (57), fifti (55), win (52), plaintiff (50), select (48), effect (46), rate (46), would (46), win-rat (42), process (40), y (39), |
Author's Keywords:
|
state supreme courts, institutions, judicial politics, state politics, torts, attitudinal model, appellate courts |
|
 | Convention | | All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. |  | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. |  | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! |  | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! |  | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. |  | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! |  | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
|
Citation:
|
MLA Citation:
| Brace, Paul., Yates, Jeff. and Boyea, Brent. "The Effects of Case Selection, Judge Ideology, and Institutional Structure in Tort Litigation in State Supreme Courts" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2008-12-11 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151950_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Brace, P. , Yates, J. and Boyea, B. D. , 2006-08-31 "The Effects of Case Selection, Judge Ideology, and Institutional Structure in Tort Litigation in State Supreme Courts" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <PDF>. 2008-12-11 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151950_index.html |
Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: There are two enormously influential perspectives on courts that offer fundamentally different predictions about court outcomes and the effects of judge ideology on those outcomes. Well-known to political scientists studying courts, the ideological voting (VI) literature argues that judge ideology is a strong predictor of court outcomes and that those outcomes should be proximate to the policy preferences of courts. Less known to political scientists but highly influential, the law and economics perspective (LE) focuses on settlement behavior of litigants who try to minimize costs and thus estimate likely outcomes in court, and settle pre-trial, simpler cases. Because of this case selection process, only complex or difficult cases make it to trial with win-rates coalescing at fifty percent for plaintiffs or defendants. From this perspective, litigant strategies cancel out the effects of judge ideology and the court outcomes do not correspond to judges’ ideological preferences. We reconcile these perspectives by examining tort cases in state supreme courts from 1995 through 1998. The contrasting perspectives stem from the fundamental institutional processes upon which each perspective is based. The LE perspective dominates in states without lower appellate courts. The process of appeal in state supreme courts without discretionary dockets is litigant-driven, with win-rates hovering at fifty percent and deviations from that norm accounted for by forces influencing litigant uncertainty. The ideological voting predicted by the VI literature occurs primarily in the context of state supreme court strategic reversals of lower appellate court decisions---a process commensurate that operating with the U.S. Supreme Court. When it comes to judicial outcomes, institutional structure is a critical element shaping the influence of litigants and judge ideology. |
Get this Document:
Find this citation or document at one or all of these locations below. The links below may have the citation or the entire document for free or you may purchase access to the document. Clicking on these links will change the site you're on and empty your shopping cart.
| Document Type: |
PDF |
| Page count: |
30 |
| Word count: |
8516 |
| Text sample: |
| The Effects of Case Selection Judge Ideology and Institutional Structure in Tort Litigation in State Supreme Courts Paul Brace Clarence Carter Professor Department of Political Science Rice University 6100 Main Street Houston TX 77005 pbrace@rice.edu Jeff Yates Department of Political Science University of Georgia Athens GA 30602 jyates@uga.edu Brent D. Boyea Department of Political Science The University of Texas at Arlington 601 S. Nedderman Drive Arlington TX 76019 boyea@uta.edu Paper prepared for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American |
| .001 -0.92 .001 .001 1.56 -.002 .001 -1.51 Constant .491 .034 14.62 .651 .025 25.61 .316 .055 5.72 N 44 44 44 R2 .63 .81 .45 rho .21 .31 .40 Entries in bold are significant at the .05 level. 28 |
Similar Titles:
The Effect of Ideology on Supreme Court Judging Over Time
The Conditional Effects of Selection Method on Voting in the State Supreme Courts
Selection Processes and CoalitionBehavior in the State Supreme Courts
The Red-Blue Divide on the Bench: An Examination of the Effects of Selection Systems on Partisan Divisions in State Supreme Court Decisions.
|
|