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Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base? Effects of Political Competition, Voter Turnout, and Partisan Loyalties on the Ideological Convergence of Vote-Maximizing Candidates in Two-Party Competition |
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Abstract:
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For vote-maximizing candidates in two-party contests, basic Downsian theory argues for candidate convergence away from their own party’s supporters and toward the views of the median voter in the district, and it also leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close. Yet, the available evidence from the U.S. Congress – both the work we report here using DW-NOMINATE scores over the 1952-2000 period and that of many other scholars using closely related methodologies – challenges these predictions. Drawing on and extending recent work of Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005), we propose a neo-Downsian model to explain non-convergence re-sults. Our model allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competi-tion, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout that can lead vote-maximizing candidates, even candidates in close elections, to seek to mobilize their voter base in terms of turnout by adopting positions attractive to the party faithful, rather than courting the median voter by moving towards the center. Furthermore, in our model, the winners from the party whose supporters are more ideologically concentrated (in the U.S., the Re-publicans) can be expected to display even less relationship between their ideological lo-cations and election competitiveness in their districts than is true for the representatives from the party whose voters are more ideologically dispersed. |
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candid (188), 1 (135), democrat (122), partisan (119), parti (112), posit (106), vote (89), republican (87), elect (83), voter (78), district (71), ideolog (68), e (68), 2 (59), d (57), b (56), competit (52), r (51), result (50), constitu (49), polit (46), |
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Association:
Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Adams, James., Brunell, Thomas., Grofman, Bernard. and Merrill, Sam. "Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base? Effects of Political Competition, Voter Turnout, and Partisan Loyalties on the Ideological Convergence of Vote-Maximizing Candidates in Two-Party Competition" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2008-12-11 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p152307_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Adams, J. , Brunell, T. L., Grofman, B. and Merrill, S. , 2006-08-31 "Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base? Effects of Political Competition, Voter Turnout, and Partisan Loyalties on the Ideological Convergence of Vote-Maximizing Candidates in Two-Party Competition" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <PDF>. 2008-12-11 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p152307_index.html |
Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: For vote-maximizing candidates in two-party contests, basic Downsian theory argues for candidate convergence away from their own party’s supporters and toward the views of the median voter in the district, and it also leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close. Yet, the available evidence from the U.S. Congress – both the work we report here using DW-NOMINATE scores over the 1952-2000 period and that of many other scholars using closely related methodologies – challenges these predictions. Drawing on and extending recent work of Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005), we propose a neo-Downsian model to explain non-convergence re-sults. Our model allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competi-tion, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout that can lead vote-maximizing candidates, even candidates in close elections, to seek to mobilize their voter base in terms of turnout by adopting positions attractive to the party faithful, rather than courting the median voter by moving towards the center. Furthermore, in our model, the winners from the party whose supporters are more ideologically concentrated (in the U.S., the Re-publicans) can be expected to display even less relationship between their ideological lo-cations and election competitiveness in their districts than is true for the representatives from the party whose voters are more ideologically dispersed. |
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41 |
| Word count: |
12988 |
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| Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base? James Adams Department of Political Science University of California Davis Thomas L. Brunell School of Social Sciences The University of Texas at Dallas Bernard Grofman Department of Political Science and Center for the Study of Democracy University of California Irvine Samuel Merrill III Department of Mathematics and Computer Science Wilkes University *We are indebted to William Koetzle for providing us access to data on district demographic ho mogeneity and to Keith |
| Jr. “Avoidance or Engagement? Issue Conver gence in U.S. Presidential Campaigns 1960Â2000.” American Journal of Political Science 48(4): 650Â661. Snyder James. 1994. "Safe Seats Marginal Seats and Party Platforms: The Logic of Party Differentiation." Economics and Politics 6(3): 201Â213. Uslaner Eric M. 1999. The Movers and the Shirkers: Representatives and Ideologues in the Senate. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Van Houweling Robert P. and Paul M. Sniderman. 2005. “The Political Logic of a Downsian Space.” Working paper. Wittman |
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