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Association: Name: Southern Political Science Association URL: http://www.spsa.net
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212187_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Segal, Jeffrey., Westerland, Chad. and Lindquist, Stefanie. "Contres, the Court and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA, Jan 09, 2008 <Not Available>. 2008-09-03 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212187_index.html>

Segal, J. , Westerland, C. and Lindquist, S. A. (2008, Jan) "Contres, the Court and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA <Not Available>. 2008-09-03 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212187_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper constructs an empirical test to evaluate separation of powers models of Supreme Court behavior. We specify a model of the Court's decisions in cases involving judicial review of Congressional enactments. The model incorporates measures of the preferences of both the enacting Congress as well as the sitting Congress at the time of the Court's decision, in addition to the Court's preferences. These data allow us to test whether the Court considers the preferences of the sitting legislature or if the Court only considers its own preferences over the challenged legislation.

Leaving the Legal Model Behind: A Consequence of a Pragmatic Analysis of Judicial Power and Review in the U.S.?

The Limits of Judicial Modeling: Comparing Theories of Judicial Decision-Making in Separation of Powers Cases