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The Unlocked Door in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Why States Recognize and Withdraw from Voluntary Regional Human Rights Courts |
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Abstract:
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This paper applies and augments theories about treaty ratification and recognition of other international courts to explore why states voluntarily recognize and withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 24 of 35 OAS states have recognized the Court, but two have withdrawn and Venezuela has threatened to withdraw. Using statistical analysis and case studies, the paper tests whether factors such as cheap talk, coercion by a hegemon, institutional or economic incentives, democracy, recent democratization, or type of legal system have an impact on which states recognize the Court. The same factors, along with non-democratic regime changes, internal conflict, and types of cases before the Court, are applied to the decision to withdraw or remain under the Court’s jurisdiction after recognition. Results indicate that civil law legal systems and new democracies are more likely to recognize the Court, raising questions about whether the system can integrate stable democracies in North America and the English-speaking Caribbean. The finding with respect to recent democratization supports Moravscik’s theory that these states may seek to “lock in” democratic reforms through recognition of a regional court. However, the case studies suggest that non-democratic regime changes after recognition significantly increase the likelihood of withdrawal and indicate mixed results for the Court’s ability to “lock in” reforms, in part because of the voluntary nature of its jurisdiction. Implications for the European Court, which has expanded into new democracies in E. Europe, and the forthcoming African Court are drawn from the results. |
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amnesti (137), law (122), state (75), intern (75), crime (74), rule (56), human (55), right (54), prosecut (52), war (41), abus (37), use (32), includ (32), also (31), violat (30), icc (30), may (28), conflict (27), case (27), commit (25), howev (25), |
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Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Lantrip, Julie. "The Unlocked Door in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Why States Recognize and Withdraw from Voluntary Regional Human Rights Courts" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2008-12-11 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252191_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Lantrip, J. , 2008-03-26 "The Unlocked Door in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Why States Recognize and Withdraw from Voluntary Regional Human Rights Courts" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA Online <PDF>. 2008-12-11 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252191_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper applies and augments theories about treaty ratification and recognition of other international courts to explore why states voluntarily recognize and withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 24 of 35 OAS states have recognized the Court, but two have withdrawn and Venezuela has threatened to withdraw. Using statistical analysis and case studies, the paper tests whether factors such as cheap talk, coercion by a hegemon, institutional or economic incentives, democracy, recent democratization, or type of legal system have an impact on which states recognize the Court. The same factors, along with non-democratic regime changes, internal conflict, and types of cases before the Court, are applied to the decision to withdraw or remain under the Court’s jurisdiction after recognition. Results indicate that civil law legal systems and new democracies are more likely to recognize the Court, raising questions about whether the system can integrate stable democracies in North America and the English-speaking Caribbean. The finding with respect to recent democratization supports Moravscik’s theory that these states may seek to “lock in” democratic reforms through recognition of a regional court. However, the case studies suggest that non-democratic regime changes after recognition significantly increase the likelihood of withdrawal and indicate mixed results for the Court’s ability to “lock in” reforms, in part because of the voluntary nature of its jurisdiction. Implications for the European Court, which has expanded into new democracies in E. Europe, and the forthcoming African Court are drawn from the results. |
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7356 |
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| Is Justice a Flexible Concept or a Hard and Fast Law? The Status of Amnesty Laws and the Duty to Investigate Human Rights Abuses under International Law Julie Lantrip Georgetown University jcl62@georgetown.edu Draft Version March 23 2008 Comments are welcome but please do not cite without permission. Julie Lantrip Page 2 8/13/2008 Prohibition of amnesty laws is a putative rule under international law that attempts to declare illegal all domestic laws that exclude the possibility of criminally prosecuting members |
| further research will need to analyze whether amnesty laws could be made under state of emergency provisions in some treaties that allow derogation from treaty 5 See (Putnam 1988). Julie Lantrip Page 14 8/13/2008 provisions though most of these derogation provisions exempt the substantive abuses covered by the proposed rule against amnesty laws and thus amnesty laws arguably are also exempted. Lastly more research is necessary along the lines of Priscilla Hayner’s book on truth commissions (Hayner 2001) to |
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