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Electoral Volatility, Competition, and Third Party Candidacies in U.S. Gubernatorial Elections |
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Abstract:
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Given the low probability of electoral success, third party participation in U.S. elections is a puzzling phenomenon. We develop a general theory of third party candidacies based on the electoral context, focusing on electoral competition and volatility. When electoral competition is either low or high we expect the number of third party candidates to be high, due to the opportunities to raise attention to policy issues or affect the election outcome. Moderate levels of competition will produce low levels of third party candidate participation, as there are fewer prospects of drawing votes or attention. Electoral volatility is expected to have a positive effect on third party candidacies, since high volatility signals a de-aligned electorate. We evaluate our claims using data from 1980-2000 gubernatorial elections. The results of the analysis support our claims, suggesting that third party candidacies are shaped by the degree of electoral volatility and competition. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
parti (242), candid (169), third (147), elect (129), elector (105), competit (73), volatil (51), polit (50), number (50), vote (46), candidaci (44), state (42), minor (37), margin (36), expect (35), victori (34), 1 (31), major (31), high (30), gubernatori (30), may (29), |
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Association:
Name: MPSA Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Best, Robin. and Lem, Steve. "Electoral Volatility, Competition, and Third Party Candidacies in U.S. Gubernatorial Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 03, 2008 <Not Available>. 2008-12-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p268606_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Best, R. E. and Lem, S. B. , 2008-04-03 "Electoral Volatility, Competition, and Third Party Candidacies in U.S. Gubernatorial Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2008-12-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p268606_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Given the low probability of electoral success, third party participation in U.S. elections is a puzzling phenomenon. We develop a general theory of third party candidacies based on the electoral context, focusing on electoral competition and volatility. When electoral competition is either low or high we expect the number of third party candidates to be high, due to the opportunities to raise attention to policy issues or affect the election outcome. Moderate levels of competition will produce low levels of third party candidate participation, as there are fewer prospects of drawing votes or attention. Electoral volatility is expected to have a positive effect on third party candidacies, since high volatility signals a de-aligned electorate. We evaluate our claims using data from 1980-2000 gubernatorial elections. The results of the analysis support our claims, suggesting that third party candidacies are shaped by the degree of electoral volatility and competition. |
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| Document Type: |
application/pdf |
| Page count: |
31 |
| Word count: |
7307 |
| Text sample: |
| Electoral Volatility Competition and Third Party Candidacies in U.S. Gubernatorial Elections Robin E. Best* Steve B. Lem Department of Political Science Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences 302 Bowman Hall Leiden University Kent State University Wassenaarseweg 52 Kent OH 442422300 RB Leiden Netherlands Phone: +31 (0)71 5273929 1 (330) 672-8928 Fax: +31 (0)71 5273815 1 (330) 672-2060 E-mail: rbest@fsw.leidenuniv.nl slem@kent.edu Prepared for presentation at the 66th annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association April 3 – |
| -387.135 * = p ≤ .05; ** = p ≤ .001. All significance tests are one-tailed. 28 Figure 1 Margin of Victory and the Number of Third Party Candidates 2.5 Minor Party Candidates 1.5 1 2 0 20 40 60 Margin of Victory 29 Figure 2 Electoral Volatility and the Number of Third Party Candidates 4 Minor Party Candidates 2 1 3 0 10 20 30 40 50 Electoral Volatility 30 |
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