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The Hidden Politics of Regulation: Interest Group Influence in Agency Rule Development |
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Abstract:
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I theorize that ex parte communications during agency rule development open a pathway for organized interests to lobby agency officials. Using multi-level modeling techniques, I test this argument with data derived from content analysis of government documents and a telephone survey of 133 interested parties, who were active during rule development. I find that ex parte communications between interested parties and agency officials influence the content of regulatory policy outputs. Moreover, this result holds despite controlling for formal influence methods and other rival contextual and political explanations. I then demonstrate that certain types of interested parties are more likely to be ex parte participants, which suggests a bias towards resource-rich interests during agency lobbying. I conclude that political battles are often fought, and won, by organized interests during a stage of the American policymaking process that scholars have often over-looked: agency rule development. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
rule (254), agenc (137), inform (118), interest (95), influenc (84), develop (69), particip (69), comment (64), public (60), level (60), polit (60), rulemak (50), anprm (49), model (46), variabl (46), group (46), polici (44), 1 (39), make (38), parti (38), administr (38), |
Author's Keywords:
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Rulemaking, Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Policymaking, Bureaucratic Politics, Interest Groups, Organized Interests, Policymaking Process, Rule Formation, and Rule Development |
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Association:
Name: MPSA Annual National Conference URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Yackee, Susan. "The Hidden Politics of Regulation: Interest Group Influence in Agency Rule Development" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 03, 2008 <Not Available>. 2008-10-22 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p269024_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Yackee, S. W. , 2008-04-03 "The Hidden Politics of Regulation: Interest Group Influence in Agency Rule Development" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2008-10-22 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p269024_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: I theorize that ex parte communications during agency rule development open a pathway for organized interests to lobby agency officials. Using multi-level modeling techniques, I test this argument with data derived from content analysis of government documents and a telephone survey of 133 interested parties, who were active during rule development. I find that ex parte communications between interested parties and agency officials influence the content of regulatory policy outputs. Moreover, this result holds despite controlling for formal influence methods and other rival contextual and political explanations. I then demonstrate that certain types of interested parties are more likely to be ex parte participants, which suggests a bias towards resource-rich interests during agency lobbying. I conclude that political battles are often fought, and won, by organized interests during a stage of the American policymaking process that scholars have often over-looked: agency rule development. |
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application/pdf |
| Page count: |
33 |
| Word count: |
11188 |
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| The Hidden Politics of Regulation: Interest Group Influence in Agency Rule Development* Susan Webb Yackee Ph.D. Assistant Professor The University of Wisconsin at Madison La Follette School of Public Affairs and Department of Political Science 1225 Observatory Drive Madison WI 53706 syackee@lafollette.wisc.edu March 21 2008 Abstract I theorize that ex parte communications during agency rule development open a pathway for organized interests to lobby agency officials. Using multi-level modeling techniques I test this argument with data derived from content |
| article are significant with p<0.05 in two tailed tests. 33 I investigate whether or not participants with a greater level of expertise (as measured by whether a JD MD PhD other scientist or engineer wrote the comment) are also informal participants. I find that informal participants are on average 50 percent more likely to be an “expert”. I also anticipate that informal participants will be located in the Washington D.C. area at a higher rate than non-informal participants. In |
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