Author's Keywords: insider trading, corporate governance, globalization, capital mobility	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64332_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Mabe, William. "Capital Mobility and Insider Trading Laws" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2008-10-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64332_index.html>

Mabe, W. , 2003-08-27 "Capital Mobility and Insider Trading Laws" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2008-10-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64332_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: I argue that higher levels of capital openness lead states to both adopt and enforce insider trading laws earlier than they would have if they were less open to capital flows. I develop my argument by identifying the actors with stakes in insider trading, carefully deriving their preferences from their economic interests, and then explaining why capital mobility is likely to empower the proponents of insider trading prohibitions. The key groups, the insiders and outsiders within firms, have very different preferences for insider trading and hence for its prohibition. Whereas insiders benefit from making stock trades on inside information, outsiders pay costs as a result of those trades, in terms of higher trading costs. By facilitating the growth of stock markets and benefiting the most mobile segments of the capital class (outsiders), capital openness augments the power of outsiders relative to insiders and increases the probability that policy will change in a manner that is consistent with their interests. I use survival analysis test this argument and examine the timing of the adoption and enforcement of insider trading laws in 20 OECD countries. The results strongly support my basic argument. Finally, I briefly consider the German case, which comes up as a significant anomaly in the quantitative analysis and offer some evaluation of how it affects my theory.

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