Author's Keywords: partisan politics; international trade	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73283_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Widsten, Amy. "Testing a Factoral Model of Partisan Politics and International Trade Dispute Initiation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2008-10-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73283_index.html>

Widsten, A. , 2004-03-17 "Testing a Factoral Model of Partisan Politics and International Trade Dispute Initiation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online <.PDF>. 2008-10-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73283_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Current research in the political economy of trade policy debates the role of different configurations of interests based on the degree of asset specificity they possess. Some argue that the Ricardo-Viner, or "specific-factors" model, best represents trade policy, as it implies that groups with fixed or immobile assets are more likely to lobby for protection. Others find that there is a higher degree of domestic cohesiveness on trade, with interests dividing along factoral, or partisan, lines. While there have been several studies arguing one way or the other, to date there have been few empirical tests to determine which model possesses more explanatory power. In the following paper, I provide a test for the factoral hypothesis of trade preferences using data on trade disputes launched by 25 advanced industrialized countries in the GATT/WTO in the period 1970-2000. I find that trade dispute initiation, does indeed divide along partisan lines, and that both party organization and party ideology matter. Whether a state will promote protectionist or trade-expanding policies depends on whether the governing coalition of that state is left or right-leaning; with left-wing governments supporting protectionist policies, and right-leaning governments favoring trade opening or export-promoting policies. Further, I argue that international trade institutions have been evolving toward more stringent mechanisms (GATT/WTO) through a process of delegation that provides the potential for a stable equilibrium for trade policy-making.

Whither the Internationalist Coalition in American Foreign Policy? The Domestic Politics of International Trade and Foreign Aid Policy, 1980-2006

Whither the Internationalist Coalition in American foreign Policy? The Domestic Politics of International Trade and Foreign Aid Policy, 1980-2006

Industrial Policy and Competition in Developing Countries: From the Regulatory State Model to New Governance in Economic Development