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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83500_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Rose, Shanna. "Institutional Foundations of Executive Budget Power: Evidence from the American States" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2008-10-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83500_index.html>

Rose, S. , 2004-04-15 "Institutional Foundations of Executive Budget Power: Evidence from the American States" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2008-10-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83500_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper examines the institutional sources of executive budget power using cross-section and panel data from the American states. I find that institutions that enable governors to reduce the budget—such as the item-reduction veto and the authority to impound appropriations—contribute to governors’ budget power vis-à-vis state legislatures, while institutions that enable them to increase the budget—such as the ability to authorize supplemental expenditures—do not. This finding supports the theory that, as a result of the “common pool” problem arising from centralized financing of distributive public projects, legislatures have higher spending targets than executives, all else equal. In addition, I find that the link between budget-reducing institutions and executive power is particularly strong when the governor is a Republican and Democrats control one or both chambers of the legislature. This result is consistent with previous findings that Democratic politicians in the American states have higher spending targets than Republicans, all else equal.

The Power and Influence of Campaign Contributions on Legislation in the American States: Institutional Characteristics that Determine the Efficacy of Money

The Allocation of the US Federal Budget to the States: Evidence on the Power of the Purse