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School Choice, No Child Left Behind, and the Problem of Measurement

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Abstract:

On the surface, the two major educational reform
initiatives currently underway in the United States, school choice and
No Child Left Behind, appear to be very different in theory, emphasis,
and approach. Choice is a bottom-up empowerment of customers, while No
Child Left Behind is a top-down centralized accountability system. Both
of these initiatives, however, struggle against the unobserved nature
of process and product in educational production, often relying on
aggregate test score data to overcome these informational
problems—explicitly, in the case of No Child Left Behind, and
implicitly, in parents’ use of test scores and similar ratings in their
evaluations of prospective schools. Scholars of public administration
such as James Q. Wilson have argued that bureaucrats in organizations
whose processes and products are unobservable will tend towards
risk-aversion. However, scholars have not adequately considered the
importance of peer effects in educational production and measurement.
Parents seeking to place their children in schools and regulators
seeking to sanction schools on the basis of the same aggregate
achievement data reinforce tendencies of defining quality based on the
student body, rather than what the school is doing for individual
students. Using original survey data collected from Minnesota public
school principals in the fall of 2003, I examine the bureaucratic
responses to both school choice and No Child Left Behind. I pay
particular attention to principals’ views of their own influence,
autonomy, and leadership across school policy areas as well as
perceptions about the impact that school choice and No Child Left
Behind are having or will have on their own leadership. I focus on
patterns of bureaucratic response among principals experiencing either
a loss of customers to school choice, potential state sanction for
insufficient test scores, or both. I argue that the informational
problems in measuring bureaucratic performance in education—either by
parents or regulators—override the theoretical differences in choice
and test-based accountability, resulting in similar patterns of risk
aversion on the part of public school principals in response to these
reforms. I conclude with an exploration of incentive structures that
might be used to mitigate these unintended policy
consequences.
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Association:
Name: The Midwest Political Science Association
URL:
http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/


Citation:
URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83764_index.html
Direct Link:
HTML Code:

MLA Citation:

Abernathy, Scott. "School Choice, No Child Left Behind, and the Problem of Measurement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2008-08-16 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83764_index.html>

APA Citation:

Abernathy, S. F. (2004, Apr) "School Choice, No Child Left Behind, and the Problem of Measurement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois <Not Available>. 2008-08-16 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83764_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: On the surface, the two major educational reform
initiatives currently underway in the United States, school choice and
No Child Left Behind, appear to be very different in theory, emphasis,
and approach. Choice is a bottom-up empowerment of customers, while No
Child Left Behind is a top-down centralized accountability system. Both
of these initiatives, however, struggle against the unobserved nature
of process and product in educational production, often relying on
aggregate test score data to overcome these informational
problems—explicitly, in the case of No Child Left Behind, and
implicitly, in parents’ use of test scores and similar ratings in their
evaluations of prospective schools. Scholars of public administration
such as James Q. Wilson have argued that bureaucrats in organizations
whose processes and products are unobservable will tend towards
risk-aversion. However, scholars have not adequately considered the
importance of peer effects in educational production and measurement.
Parents seeking to place their children in schools and regulators
seeking to sanction schools on the basis of the same aggregate
achievement data reinforce tendencies of defining quality based on the
student body, rather than what the school is doing for individual
students. Using original survey data collected from Minnesota public
school principals in the fall of 2003, I examine the bureaucratic
responses to both school choice and No Child Left Behind. I pay
particular attention to principals’ views of their own influence,
autonomy, and leadership across school policy areas as well as
perceptions about the impact that school choice and No Child Left
Behind are having or will have on their own leadership. I focus on
patterns of bureaucratic response among principals experiencing either
a loss of customers to school choice, potential state sanction for
insufficient test scores, or both. I argue that the informational
problems in measuring bureaucratic performance in education—either by
parents or regulators—override the theoretical differences in choice
and test-based accountability, resulting in similar patterns of risk
aversion on the part of public school principals in response to these
reforms. I conclude with an exploration of incentive structures that
might be used to mitigate these unintended policy
consequences.

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Associated Document AvailableThe Midwest Political Science Association
Associated Document AvailablePolitical Research Online


Similar Titles:
No Child Left Behind, School Choice, and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school District: A Case Study

School Choice, No Child Left Behind, and the Problem of Educational Production


 
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