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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84099_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Beaulieu, Emily. "Why Not Boycott? Public Finance ofPolitical Parties and Party Election Boycotts" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2008-10-10 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84099_index.html>

Beaulieu, E. A. , 2004-04-15 "Why Not Boycott? Public Finance ofPolitical Parties and Party Election Boycotts" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2008-10-10 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84099_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper examines the causes of election boycotts, based on a new dataset covering all multi-party elections worldwide since 1990. My data reveal that, since 1990, political parties in fifty-three countries have boycotted a total of seventy-one national-level elections. In all of these cases, the parties involved announced explicitly and publicly that they were not participating in the election in question, urging voters to follow their lead. What explains why some countries have frequent boycotts while other, seemingly similar, countries have few or none? This paper is the first to model an election boycott as a strategic decision that political parties make, in light of both the possible benefits associated with a boycott and, perhaps more importantly, the potential costs. I focus in particular on whether the provision of public finance for political parties affects the decision to boycott. The central question I address is: Does the potential loss of state finance, typically awarded on the basis of vote shares garnered in the previous election, deter election boycotts?

Electoral Politics and Vote Cleavages in a New Democracy: Split Ticket Voting in Nicaragua's 2006 Presidential Election

Coalition Parties versus Coalitions of Parties: How Electoral Agency Shapes the Political Logic of Costs and Benefits

Why Not Boycott? Public Finance of Political Parties and Party Election Boycotts