1
Leading figures in the Conservatives in the UK, the German Christian Social
Union (CSU) and the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) have engaged in anti-
immigrant rhetoric but have been subject to significant internal and public
criticism afterward. In general such outbursts are sporadic rather than sustained
(see Eatwell, 1994, p.315; and Husbands 1992, p.2).
2
.
The Austrian FPO, for instance, saw its support almost double from a modest
9.7% of the vote in 1986 to 16.6% in 1990 after Jorg Haider took over the
leadership and took on the issue of immigration. Similarly, the Swiss People’s
Party, after consistently trailing its three coalition partners in elections with
around 10% of the vote succeeded in gaining the highest share of the vote in the
1999 (23%) parliamentary elections, after it made immigration a central campaign
issue. Finally, the electoral fortunes of the Norwegian Progress Party were
spectacularly revived in the late 1980s after the party moved to adopt an anti-
immigrant stance in the middle of the decade. From just under 4% of the vote in
1985 the party went on to gain almost 14% of the vote in 1989.
3
. For example, Knigge (1998) uses unemployment as her measure of
socioeconomic deprivation, as does Chapin (1992); Betz and Swank (1995), however,
use per capita income. In addition, other variables differ in each study. Betz
and Swank incorporate a very large number of aggregate socioeconomic and political
systemic factors, such as state centralization and post-industrial labor force
percentages. Cotter (1995) uses traditional conservative support. Jackman and
Volpert (1996) use measures of the level of party system fragmentation. The result
is a lack of consensus on the appropriate variables for similar operational
definitions.
4
.
See also Koopmans’ (1996) discussion of the factors promoting racial
violence in Germany. The analysis concluded that protracted conflict by politicians
over the immigration issue played a key role in stimulating racial violence, by
provoking higher media attention to the issue.
5
. Charlot, M. 1986. “L’emergence du Front National.” Revue Francaise de
Science Politique. 36:30-45). Quoted in Husbands (1988), Pp.711.
6
. Empirical literature on this question suggests that realistic conflict is
not strongly linked to individual level SES, i.e. it is not primarily a rational
response of actors to perceived or real losses in their personal status (Sears and
Vidanage 1995; Olzak 1993; Studlar 1979).
7
. For a discussion of the broader area of symbolic politics see: Krosnick,
J. 1991. “The Stability of Political Preferences: Comparisons of Symbolic and
Nonsymbolic Attitudes.” American Journal of Political Science 35(2):547-76.
8
These Eurobarometers contained the most extensive and consistent measures of
attitudes toward immigrants of the surveys available.
9
. The extreme right-wing anti-immigrant parties listed in the 1988
Eurobarometer include: Centre Party (Netherlands), National Political Union
(Greece), Flemish Block (Belgium), National Democratic Party (Germany), National
Front (France), Progress Party (Denmark), and the Italian Social Movement-National
Right (Italy). In the 1994 Eurobarometer, the ERAI parties include: Centre
Democrats (Netherlands), Flemish Block (Belgium), National Alliance (Italy),
National Front (France), National Movement (Luxembourg), Northern League (Italy),
Progress Party (Denmark), Republicans (Germany), and Spanish Phalanx (Spain).
Parties were identified based upon the extant literature and media reports that
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