Author's Keywords: Executive order, prerogative powers, presidency, presidential power, war powers	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42003_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Rader, Eric. "Presidents at War: Executive Orders as Prerogatives During Wartime" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42003_index.html>

Rader, E. W. , 2005-09-01 "Presidents at War: Executive Orders as Prerogatives During Wartime" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <PDF>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p42003_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Presidents from George Washington to George W. Bush have used executive orders as prerogative powers of the presidency. John Locke, many of whose theories were influential with the Framers of the Constitution, wrote in the Second Treatise that in emergency situations when the legislative branch was unable to act, the executive could suspend ordinary governing arrangements to deal with the emergency. According to Locke, the executive was only justified in doing this when he had the consent of the citizens and when he was acting in their best interests. Locke's notion of the prerogative power has been used to justify modern use of prerogative powers by presidents, particularly during wars. Among the most important prerogatives of modern presidents is the executive order, a formal tool to manage the executive branch. When presidents use executive orders as a prerogative during wartime, they are rarely challenged by the public, Congress or the courts. For a president to legitimately and constitutionally use this power, he or she must base his or her action on the commander-in-chief powers in the Constitution or a relevant federal law. This paper examines the modern use of executive orders as a prerogative power in wartime. Using case-study analysis, this paper will examine the following executive orders: Franklin D. Roosevelt's order interning Japanese Americans during World War II; Harry S. Truman's order seizing the nation's steel mills during the Korean War; George H.W. Bush's order freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets during the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991; and George W. Bush's military orders allowing those defined as enemy combatants to be tried by military tribunals following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A model of theoretical and constitutional acceptability is devised to classify these orders and determine the implications for executive power and constitutional democracy. The theory of this paper is that presidents must consider both the theoretical limits set by Locke in the Second Treatise, as well as the constitutional limits of the American political system, when using executive orders during wartime. The executive order is not an unlimited prerogative power and the analysis in this paper will seek to highlight some needed limits on presidential prerogatives.

The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Explaining the Resistance of Weak States and Consequences for American Foreign Policy

The United States and the Jurisdiction of International Courts: A Comparative Case Study of United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings from 1924, 1931, 1946, and 2000