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Young People, Relativism, and Natural Law
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12
Most informants were not this bold or this harsh, but they came close.
None, by the way, seem particularly bothered by the minimal character of the contract. Nor are they bothered by the failure of the Enlightenment project, as Alasdair MacIntyre calls it—that is, the failure of reason to justify morality. (MacIntyre 1981, 49-75) Not reason, but common humanity, minimal as it is, grounds the beliefs of both the metaphysical biologists and the self-evident social contract theorists.
The difference is that that the self-evident social contract theorists see
basic relationships as themselves tantamount to basic goods, and in this respect their view differs from the new natural law of both Finnis and George, for whom basic goods are individual properties (indeed, possessions), as I have suggested. One sees this most clearly in Gómez-Lobo’s formulation of the new natural law. “We should care deeply for the goods of those we love,” not “we should care deeply for those we love.” And “it is irrational intentionally to attack or destroy an instance of a basic good (i.e., directly to cause harm),” and not “it is immoral to harm other people.” (2002, 46)
For Gómez-Lobo, it is wrong to harm a basic good which just happens to
be embodied in another person, because people are where goods just happen to reside. The goods come first. For the self-evident social contract theorists among informants, on the other hand, the social contract is itself a basic good, one not possessed but shared by all who would live peaceably in this world. That’s not the worst ethic in the world. Troubling is its compatibility with most of the venal sins, and maybe a couple of mortal sins as well.
One puzzling aspect of the interviews remains, one that I cannot explain
or find a ready category for. Slightly less than half of all informants seemed to secretly, even ashamedly, believe in God. This is difficult to demonstrate with quotations, though Tom put it as clearly as any when he said in response to my pushing him on the question “Why be moral?”
“I believe in God. But I know that I can’t say that here, that you wouldn’t
accept it as an answer.”
How do you know, I asked? I might believe in God too.
“Because this is a public school [a public university actually]. We live in a
culture where everyone has such different beliefs that it’s better just to keep these things to oneself.”
Do you go to religious services, I asked?
Tom smiled sheepishly, and that was that.
Not every informant who said something like `in a secular society, God is
not a convincing enough answer to the question why be moral’ seemed to secretly believe in God. (This is, by the way, the position of the new natural law theorists, most of whom seem to be personally religious.) But it was my strong impression that almost half the informants did. Comments such as “I could refer to God, but at the university it’s better to talk in terms of law and contracts,” were not uncommon, and are the source of my hypothesis.
Unfortunately, I didn’t figure out how strange this really was until shortly
before I completed my interviews, and at that late date I couldn’t change the questions, even as I began to ask “Do you believe in God?” whenever I thought it
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12
Most informants were not this bold or this harsh, but they came close.
None, by the way, seem particularly bothered by the minimal character of the
contract. Nor are they bothered by the failure of the Enlightenment project, as
Alasdair MacIntyre calls it—that is, the failure of reason to justify morality.
(MacIntyre 1981, 49-75) Not reason, but common humanity, minimal as it is,
grounds the beliefs of both the metaphysical biologists and the self-evident social
contract theorists.
The difference is that that the self-evident social contract theorists see
basic relationships as themselves tantamount to basic goods, and in this respect
their view differs from the new natural law of both Finnis and George, for whom
basic goods are individual properties (indeed, possessions), as I have
suggested. One sees this most clearly in Gómez-Lobo’s formulation of the new
natural law. “We should care deeply for the goods of those we love,” not “we
should care deeply for those we love.” And “it is irrational intentionally to attack
or destroy an instance of a basic good (i.e., directly to cause harm),” and not “it is
immoral to harm other people.” (2002, 46)
For Gómez-Lobo, it is wrong to harm a basic good which just happens to
be embodied in another person, because people are where goods just happen to
reside. The goods come first. For the self-evident social contract theorists
among informants, on the other hand, the social contract is itself a basic good,
one not possessed but shared by all who would live peaceably in this world.
That’s not the worst ethic in the world. Troubling is its compatibility with most of
the venal sins, and maybe a couple of mortal sins as well.
One puzzling aspect of the interviews remains, one that I cannot explain
or find a ready category for. Slightly less than half of all informants seemed to
secretly, even ashamedly, believe in God. This is difficult to demonstrate with
quotations, though Tom put it as clearly as any when he said in response to my
pushing him on the question “Why be moral?”
“I believe in God. But I know that I can’t say that here, that you wouldn’t
accept it as an answer.”
How do you know, I asked? I might believe in God too.
“Because this is a public school [a public university actually]. We live in a
culture where everyone has such different beliefs that it’s better just to keep
these things to oneself.”
Do you go to religious services, I asked?
Tom smiled sheepishly, and that was that.
Not every informant who said something like `in a secular society, God is
not a convincing enough answer to the question why be moral’ seemed to
secretly believe in God. (This is, by the way, the position of the new natural law
theorists, most of whom seem to be personally religious.) But it was my strong
impression that almost half the informants did. Comments such as “I could refer
to God, but at the university it’s better to talk in terms of law and contracts,” were
not uncommon, and are the source of my hypothesis.
Unfortunately, I didn’t figure out how strange this really was until shortly
before I completed my interviews, and at that late date I couldn’t change the
questions, even as I began to ask “Do you believe in God?” whenever I thought it
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