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plural others. I draw on Nietzschean perspectivism here because we need to distinguish
the epistemic thrust of humility from mere fallibilism on the one hand, and moral
skepticism on the other. Whereas the notion of fallibilism seems too weak to do any real
moral work for us – asking us to admit the trivially true idea that we are as yet neither
perfect beings, nor beings who possess omniscient standards of knowledge – skepticism
tends to claim too much by denying us any room for confidence in our beliefs or values.
By contrast, democratic humility can serve as a precondition for mutual, reciprocal
learning and growth when humility is identified not as a form of individual self-
rapprochement or generalized moral skepticism, but as a disposition that is attuned and
actively responsive to our individual and collective boundedness as cultural and temporal
beings.
Despite Nietzsche’s vociferous rejection of humility, I think that Nietzsche
effectively expresses a conception of democratic humility and openness to others when
he argues that, “rather than making oneself uniform, we may find greater value for the
enrichment of knowledge by listening to the soft voice of different life situations; each
brings its own views with it. Thus we acknowledge and share the life and nature of many
by not treating ourselves like rigid, invariable, single individuals.”
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The question
begged by this Nietzschean sentiment is how we might make ourselves available for such
“enrichment,” making it more likely that we will attend to and hear, rather than ignore,
spurn, or expel the “soft voice of different life situations.” Humility can help make this
kind of listening possible in a way that toleration, civility, and other virtues cannot. In
contrast to other liberal virtues that cultivate a (not insignificant) respectful forbearance
towards difference, an ethos of democratic humility tells us that we always have
Convention