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something we can learn (about ourselves and others) by engaging with those differences.
Yet the conditions for such mutual learning and growth are only made possible by an
anterior, ethical orientation that motivates and opens us toward plural others. In this
respect, democratic humility corresponds to an epistemic-moral attitude which
acknowledges that because we are limited and bounded beings, and often also beings
with strong convictions and interests, we need qualities that will prompt us to be attentive
toward and receptive of others.
A second feature of democratic humility is both grounded in and animated by the
“burdens of judgment” in a pluralistic social and political universe. The burdens of
judgment are those irrepressible conditions under which we labor whenever we confront
a complex moral/political question that must be addressed. Some of these burdens, as
Rawls has enumerated them, include: (1) the evidence bearing on specific issues is
complex, often conflicting, and hard to assess; (2) even when we agree about the
considerations that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight; (3) the way we
assess evidence and weigh moral and political values is shaped to some extent by our life
experiences, which in complex modern societies are bound to differ from individual to
individual; and (4) often there are normative considerations on both sides of an issue.
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The burdens of judgment help to explain why democratic humility is necessary,
and at the same time, the practice of civic humility will make it more likely that political
actors will recognize and work within the constraints of these burdens. For Rawls, the
burdens of judgment and the irreconcilable disagreements that they generate establish the
conditions that make the operation of public reason necessary, at least on fundamental
issues of justice. At the same time, the denial of these burdens and failures of public
Convention