36
Conclusion
Can the moral vocabulary and practice of humility be re-described in such a way
as to shift it from its status as a theistic moral command, or a secular “corrective virtue”
to private vanities, and instead conceive of humility as an active moral and civic
orientation toward diverse others and toward previous judgments? I have argued that it
can, and that it is desirable to do so. I have argued that an ethos of democratic humility is
a necessary, underpinning virtue for pluralistic liberal societies because this quality most
directly relates to our capacity to engage in and to sustain an open, self-critical
examination of our social and political practices. This kind of reflexive, critical
interrogation of previous judgments and current practices, and the qualities and
dispositions that help to facilitate it are of value for at least three reasons. First, this kind
of questioning is itself a form of civic education, informing citizens of the nature and
status of politically relevant decisions. In this sense, by striving to keep the actions and
judgments of a polity open to moral and epistemic questioning, democratic humility can
also open the political sphere to the active participation of more and more people.
Second, a recognition of the legitimacy and the significance of sustaining this kind of
probing, critical disposition can foster a general sensitivity toward, and a moral/political
preparedness for the inclusion of new voices, groups, concerns, and/or issues that may
have been (inadvertently or otherwise) excluded or insufficiently attended to in prior
deliberations and political judgments.
Finally, by cultivating a capacity and willingness to re-visit and re-think, in a
public way, both our past and our present judgments, democratic humility serves as a
constitutive feature of any conception of liberal justice because it opens us up to the
Convention