9
capacities, for the humble do not simply acknowledge their limitations or resist
overestimating their moral qualities,
16
but hold a positively negative view of the self and
of the self’s moral powers without God. In his widely influential text, Of the Imitation of
Christ, Thomas Kempis (like Luther, an Augustinian monk) opens his discussion of
humility with a direct challenge to that timeless symbol of vain human reason, the
philosopher: “Surely an humble husbandman that serveth God is better than a proud
philosopher that, neglecting himself, laboreth to understand the course of the heavens.”
17
Contrasts such as these, between faith and reason, always seem susceptible to
being overdrawn (whether by priests or philosophers), and it should be added that there
are several places in Kempis’ writings where he softens the harder edges of his warnings
against learning and the autonomous use of reason.
18
Yet, if we are concerned to
understand some of the most influential expressions of humility and how this has shaped
the contemporary reception (or neglect) of this quality, it is important to recognize that
humility has long been tied to a substantive metaphysic which instructs that to know and
have contempt for ourselves is among the most important and salutary lessons for man.
19
Thus, where humility is understood as a theistically grounded command,
20
it can stand in
sharp opposition to individual moral autonomy/reason. And where humility is cultivated
as an imitative virtue, patterned (for example) after the life of Jesus, it can be at once both
socially revolutionary (the low and humble will be lifted, the powerful will be brought
low),
21
and radically de-politicizing, counseling humble accommodation to a range of
ascriptive class and gender hierarchies.
22
Convention