C
OPING WITH
C
ORPORATISM
’
S
L
EGITIMACY
D
EFICIT
:
R
ECENT
A
TTEMPTS AT
R
EFORMING THE
A
USTRIAN
C
HAMBER
S
YSTEM
1. Introduction
The Austrian system of interest representation ranks high among scales of corporatism in the
relevant literature. The particular Austrian system of “social partnership” emphasizes
consensual policy-making and includes the principal associations representing capital and
labour in the design and implementation of public policy. These associations interact with
each other and the state at the national level. Social partnership reconciles collective
bargaining with state economic policy, and in exchange subjects all economic and social
policy matters to the influence of the interest associations.
Due to the corporatist system’s ability to provide for enduring social peace, economic
success, and political predictability throughout the post-war period social partnership became
a “myth” in Austrian self-perception. Inherent in Austrian corporatism, however, is a
democratic deficit problem resulting from the secrecy and informality of its procedures, the
necessary control over its members in order to produce compliance with centralized
agreements, and the compulsory character of membership in the legally established interest
organizations. Compulsory membership deprives members of the capacity to punish
unresponsive leaders by leaving the organization. As long as the model worked well, this in-
built lack of responsiveness and accountability was not seriously questioned. Due to changes
in the institutional and economic environment, however, the Austrian model of corporatism
began to experience legitimacy problems more recently.
This paper first describes which features make Austria one of the prime cases of corporatism
and illustrates its main actors. Second, recent changes within the corporatist system and its
institutional surrounding are analysed. In a next step, the specific problems resulting out of
this mode of interest mediation are illustrated. Finally, efforts which have been undertaken to
reconcile Austria’s strong corporatism with democracy will be examined.
1
The underlying research of this work was carried out at the International Institute for Labour Studies. I would
like to thank Lucio Baccaro for initiating this project and making valuable contributions to an earlier version of
this paper.
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