Author's Keywords: central bank independence, exchange rate, monetary policy	Convention Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
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O'Mahony, Angela. "Ties that Bind: Exchange Rate Regimes Under Central Bank Independence" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 02, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59888_index.html>

O'Mahony, A. , 2004-09-02 "Ties that Bind: Exchange Rate Regimes Under Central Bank Independence" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p59888_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Traditionally, the goal of central bank independence has been seen as credible domestic monetary policy. However, by increasing the likelihood that the government will adopt a fixed exchange rate rather than maintain domestic control over monetary policy, an independent central bank may be a victim of its own success. Because a monetary policy set by an independent central bank may result in what the government considers to be adverse distributive consequences, governments may look for ways to mitigate the central bank’s control over monetary policy. In an environment in which the government values a fixed exchange rate, adopting a fixed exchange rate would not only vouchsafe the government’s preferred exchange rate regime, it might also provide the government with more favorable monetary conditions. While conventional wisdom suggests that central bank independence ties the hands of the government, the government in turn may seek to tie the hands of the central bank through the adoption of a fixed exchange rate. I test this proposition through a quantitative analysis of exchange rate choice in OECD countries and a qualitative analysis of Great Britain’s and Germany’s decisions to join the European Monetary System in 1978.

Coalition governments, social insurance and central bank independence versus inflation: fighting inflation alone or together?

Exchange Rate Regime, Central Bank Independence, and Political Business Cycles in Brazil