3 0
Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’,” p. 136.
3 1
Pap e, “T he W orld Push es B ack” ; Josef Joffe, “G ulliver U nbo und: C an Americ a Ru le the W orld?” a t:
.
3 2
Pap e, “T he W orld Push es B ack.”
3 3
Layne writes, “By facilitating “soft balancing” against the United States, the Iraq crisis may have paved
the way for “hard” balancing as well.” Layne, “America as European Hegemon,” p. 27.
3 4
Pap e, “So ft Bala ncing: H ow the W orld will Resp ond to U .S. Pr even tive W ar on Iraq.”
13
In the absence of evidence of hard balancing, some scholars have advanced the
concept of “soft balancing.” Instead of overtly challenging American power, which
would be too costly or unappealing for a variety of reasons, states are said to be able to
undertake a host of lesser actions as a way to constrain and undermine the United States.
As Walt writes, “States may not want to attract the ‘focused enmity’ of the United States,
but they may be eager to limit its freedom of action, complicate its diplomacy, sap its
strength and resolve, maximize their own autonomy and reaffirm their own rights, and
generally make the United States work harder to achieve its objectives.”
30
Pape proclaims that “the era of ‘soft balancing’ has begun”; for Joffe, “‘soft
balancing’ against Mr. Big has already set in.”
31
Pape writes, “Unless the United States
radically changes course, the use of international institutions, economic leverage, and
diplomatic maneuvering to frustrate American intentions will only grow.”
32
The central
claim is that America’s increasingly unilateralist and needlessly provocative behavior –
epitomized by the march to war in Iraq – is generating unprecedented resentment around
the world that will make life difficult for the United States and may eventually evolve
into hard balancing.
33
For example, Pape contends that the U.S. reputation for non-
aggressive intentions is being destroyed by “the most aggressive American national
security strategy ever.” As a result, “‘Soft’ balancing is likely to replace traditional hard
balancing as the principal reaction of major powers to America’s new preventive war
doctrine.”
34