(Page 2 of 43) - "Draining the Sea or Feeding the Fire?": The Use of Population Relocation in Counterinsurgency Operations authored by Greenhill, Kelly.

DRAINING THE SEA, OR FEEDING THE FIRE

Colombia, among others.

What is odd about the enduring popularity of population resettlement, however, is that despite the
frequency of its employment, the historical evidence on its efficacy in counterinsurgency

operations is mixed at best.

[9]

Its proponents rightly point to renowned successes in Malaya and

the Philippines in the 1950s as proof of its tactical value. Yet, for each of these oft-cited
successes, there have been a handful of equally well-known failures, including both the agroville
and strategic hamlet programs in Vietnam. In fact, history suggests that far more often than not,
the long-term political (and sometimes, military) costs of using population relocation as a tool of
counterinsurgency tend to outweigh the short-term military benefits, if and when even these can
be garnered. In fact, examination of counterinsurgency operations over the last century suggests
that not only does resettlement frequently fail to successfully sever ties between insurgents and
the population, but also quite often it actually catalyzes greater support for—and connections with
—rebel groups. This tends to enhance their prospects for success as well as the likelihood that
the insurgency will spread and perhaps even spill over borders into neighboring countries. The
interactive effects of the ongoing insurgency in Burundi and the outbreak of civil war in the

neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo is but one recent example that comes to mind.

[10]

The continued pervasiveness of population relocation in counterinsurgency operations in the face
of myriad failures raises several obvious questions: First, why does it remain such a popular
tactic, despite its problematic track record? Second, given that relocation schemes sometimes do
succeed, is there a potentially generalizable theory about the conditions under which they will
succeed and fail that can explain divergent outcomes? If so, what are these conditions? Or,

alternatively—as some have argued

[11]

—must each insurgency be viewed sui generis? Using

evidence from a variety of historical counterinsurgency operations—over time and across the
globe—this paper proposes two sets of hypotheses to answer these questions and offers some
preliminary tests of them. To be clear, this paper should be viewed as a plausibility probe for the
hypotheses forwarded. Detailed case studies and/or large-N analysis would be necessary to
declare more decisively that these hypotheses are valid and/or proven.

To briefly summarize the argument that follows: first, I hypothesize the relocation remains such
a popular tactic because, whatever one’s theory of victory—be it what is commonly referred to as
the “hearts-and-minds” school of counterinsurgency or the competing so-called the “coercion” or
“cost-benefit” school—population relocation often appears integral to achieving it. This is due to
the high value both schools place on keeping insurgents and non-combatants apart. Second, I
argue that indeed there is a generalizable theory of population relocation that can effectively
explain a goodly number of successes and failures. Specifically, I hypothesize that relocation
schemes frequently fail because of the problem of “unfulfilled expectations.” Simply put, for

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