4
without a defensive alliance would invite Russian intervention in the future. Retro-
Atlanticists dismissed critics’ fears of worsened security dilemma and abjured the
“Russia constant.”
5
This was the belief that Russia could not be challenged in Central
Europe when it was strong and that it should not be challenged in Central Europe when it
was weak. In short, if critics had their way, eastern Central Europe would become a
Russian rather than Soviet sphere of influence, and this was unacceptable.
Imperial multilateralists, by contrast, embraced the security dilemma as the
fundamental source of insecurity in Central Europe, but saw two security dilemmas as
important.
6
The first was the critics concern over NATO-Russian relations. The second
was the security competition among Central European states and their fears of Russian
intervention. Moreover, Germany would be the front-line NATO state and would be
tempted to undertake unilateral measures in CE should conditions deteriorate there.
While abstaining from expansion would avoid the critics’ first dilemma it would
exacerbate the second dilemma. The solution was to impose order in Central Europe, and
NATO was the best organization to achieve this – many Central European states desired
membership and the organization was revamping itself to become as much a political
institution as a security institution.
7
For imperial multilateralists, other alternatives were impractical. The EU would
not provide the states with security and in the late 1990s, the prospects for European
5
Condeleezza Rice, “Now, NATO Should Grow.” New York Times 8 Jul. 1996; William Safire,
‘NATO: Bigger is Better’, New York Times 16 Dec. 1996. In the Congress, Sen. Jesse Helms best
exemplified this position.
6
Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO.”
ForeignAffairs, 72 (Sept./Oct. 1993); Ronald D. Asmus, et al., “NATO Expansion: The Next
Steps.” Survival 37:1 (Spring 1995); Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor
(Santa Monica, CA, 1996); F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War
(Santa Monica, CA, 1993)
7
See the Nov. 1991 “Strategic Concept” http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm
Convention