3
propositions, and the few quantitative analyses that have been conducted thus far have
yielded contradictory results as well.
4
In my dissertation-in-progress, I seek to reconcile these contradictory findings by
showing that no uniform relationship exists between the impartiality of third parties and
their effectiveness as peacemakers. Building on insights from rational choice theories of
crisis bargaining and war, I argue that when, how, and why impartiality affects
intervention outcomes varies depending on the nature of the bargaining problem
preventing disputants from reaching a peaceful solution on their own as well as the
conflict management strategy employed by the intervener.
The core premise of my argument is that the outbreak of armed violence between
competing states or social groups is best understood as a bargaining failure. To promote
peace, therefore, interveners need to address the underlying bargaining problem that
prevents disputants from reaching a negotiated solution on their own. Following the
rationalist bargaining literature, I argue that there are two principal explanations for why
disputants sometimes fail to reach a peaceful compromise: (1) miscalculation resulting
from informational asymmetries and incentives to misrepresent one’s true capabilities
and/or resolve; and (2) commitment problems, i.e., the inability of actors to credibly
promise faithful implementation of an otherwise mutually acceptable settlement.
5
Starting from this typology, I first identify the basic strategies that interveners can employ
to address each of these bargaining problems, and then use game-theoretic modeling to
4
Heldt 2001; Meek 2000; and Rauchhaus 2003 find evidence supporting the honest broker thesis, while
Gelpi 1999 and Regan 2000; 2002 report that biased interveners are more likely to succeed.
5
Cf. Blainey 1973; Fearon 1995; Gartzke 1999; Goemans 2000; Morrow 1989; Wagner 2000; and
Wittman 1979. Issue indivisibilities are frequently cited as another possible rationalist explanation for
war, but their status within the rationalist framework remains somewhat contested. On this point, see
Fearon 1995, 389-90.
Convention